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Capital, Scale, and Risk Constraints to Vegetable Adoption  
Among Smallhold Farmers in Mid-Western Nepal 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Nepal’s agricultural productivity has stagnated in recent decades, resulting in 
widespread malnutrition, poverty, and civil conflict. In response, government and 
donor institutions have promoted high-input, high-return vegetable crops to 
increase earnings and productivity among smallhold farmers. This study examines 
the constraints limiting widespread adoption of these crops in the Mid-Western 
Development Region (MWDR) of Nepal. I first draw upon the technology 
adoption literature to generate predictions regarding potential capital, scale, and 
risk constraints to farmers’ vegetable adoption, and then develop Logit, Probit, 
OLS, and Ordered Probit regression models to measure the effects of these 
constraints on a sample of farmers from the MWDR. The sample is drawn from a 
field survey I conducted in Nepal from June to July, 2014. Principal regression 
results show that farm area, distance to an agricultural supplier, higher caste status, 
and food insecurity are all significantly negatively associated with vegetable 
adoption, while farmers’ age, agricultural training, and assets are significantly 
positively associated with adoption. I conclude that the surprising negative 
relation between farm size and vegetable adoption is the result of non-functioning 
labor markets, and that risk aversion is a significant barrier to vegetable adoption. 
More broadly, I find that vegetables are a relatively equitable instrument for 
poverty alleviation in Nepal.  
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Map of Nepal 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Asian Development Bank, 2010 
 
 
Located on the Himalayan plateau between China and India, Nepal spans 
three distinct ecosystems. The subtropical lowlands along the Indian 
border, known as the Tarai, are characterized by rice cultivation, while 
hillier regions to the north produce wheat and millet. Beyond these 
agricultural belts the countryside rises rapidly into subarctic conditions 
near the Tibetan border. 
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1. Introduction and Contribution 
Nepal’s agricultural productivity, once the highest in South Asia, is now the lowest in the 
region. Agricultural productivity in Nepal has risen only 28% since 1980, while productivity rose 
by 82% in India and 117% in Bangladesh over the same period (World Development Indicators 
2015). As a result of this stagnation, 35% of Nepal’s rural population lives below the national 
poverty line, and 51% of rural children suffer from malnutrition (FAO 2010). In response to 
these devastating statistics, the Nepali government, in partnership with foreign donors, has 
pushed for the adoption of “high-value vegetables” among Nepali farmers. Vegetables produce 
higher yields and diversify farmers’ diets, thus raising rural incomes and reducing malnutrition. 
Nevertheless, vegetable adoption has progressed only slowly among Nepali farmers. As 
of 2008, only 15% of farmers were cultivating vegetable crops on at least a portion of their land, 
despite the significantly higher profits to be earned from vegetable production (USAID 2008). 
Evidently, significant constraints on vegetable adoption remain, potentially including limitations 
of scale (Nepali farms tend to be very small), risk (farmers often lack crop insurance), and capital 
(farmers face liquidity constraints and poverty traps). To the extent that these constraints limit 
vegetable adoption in Nepal, they also hamper rural development and nutrition. 
This study employs data on farmers from Nepal’s Mid-Western Development Region in 
order to measure factors constraining vegetable adoption. Data were collected through farmer 
interviews conducted by the author during June and July, 2014. Logit and Probit regression 
models estimate the effects of demographic and farm characteristics on farmers’ likelihood of 
vegetable adoption. Results indicate that, contrary to the traditional assumption that large farms 
adopt first (due to economies of scale, access to credit, and higher levels of wealth and 
information), farm size actually appears to be negatively related to adoption likelihood, when 
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controlling for other variables. Larger farms have lower family-size to land ratios and struggle to 
secure sufficient supplies of labor to produce labor-intensive vegetables, whereas smaller farms 
optimize their limited supplies of land through vegetable cultivation.    
Contribution 
 
Many studies of technology adoption in agriculture estimate either the binary adoption 
decision, or the share of adoption, but not both. Furthermore, studies using Logit and Probit 
regression models to model adoption behavior often neglect to calculate marginal effects, and 
especially the effects of increasing scales of adoption (Suman 2011; Paudel 2009; Zeller et al. 
1998). The models employed in this study bridge these divides by calculating marginal effects 
both for binary Logit and Probit models and by computing an Ordered Probit model with 
marginal effects. The use of a range of comparative models provides a fuller understanding of 
the magnitude of variable trends in adoption decisions. 
More broadly, the measurement in this study of a negative relation between farm area and 
vegetable adoption suggests that agricultural development analysts must adapt their 
understanding of technology adoption according to the particular characteristics of the 
technology at hand, specifically its level of labor-intensity. In Mid-Western Nepal, microcredit 
schemes reduce credit constraints, farmers’ groups and marketing collectives reduce information 
asymmetries, and the communal sharing and renting of mechanical inputs improves access to 
capital. These conditions diminish the importance of scale-biased constraints and highlight the 
decisiveness of labor constraints, suggesting that contemporary agrarian systems may no longer 
follow the traditional theories and predictions of agricultural economics. 
 Finally, the negative relationship between farm size and vegetable adoption indicates that 
vegetables are a progressive rather than regressive technology. That is, smaller farmers adopt 
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first. Vegetables thus prove to be a relatively equitable instrument for poverty alleviation when 
compared to scale-biased technologies such as tractors. 
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes trends in Nepal’s 
recent agricultural development and highlights the importance of agricultural productivity 
growth in the reduction of rural poverty and malnutrition.  
 Section 3 offers a broad review of agricultural development as a discipline, and then 
explores the ways in which farm scale, risk, and capital shape farmers’ technology adoption 
decisions. The focus of this section is on generating testable predictions of adoption behavior. 
 Section 4 describes the design and implementation of my field survey in Mid-Western 
Nepal, and describes the dataset used in this study. 
 Section 5 uses the dataset to establish a series of empirical facts about vegetable 
production. I later draw upon these facts to facilitate the interpretation of regression results. 
 Section 6 reviews the empirical modeling of agricultural technology adoption behavior, 
and then develops Logit, Probit, OLS, and Ordered Probit regression models to measure farmers’ 
vegetable adoption behavior in Mid-Western Nepal. 
 Section 7 presents principal regression results of the models developed in Section 6, and 
interprets the signs, coefficient magnitudes, and marginal effects of these models. 
 Section 8 offers a broader-level discussion and interpretation of the results. 
  Section 9 concludes the study by reviewing its principal findings and contribution and 
offering policy recommendations to policy-makers in Nepal. 
 The Appendices that follow detail methods used to calculate farmers’ costs and returns in 
the dataset (Appendix A), measure an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity 
(Appendix B), and present the questionnaires used in my field survey (Appendix C). 
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2. Agricultural Development in Nepal 
Despite the steady growth of urban populations over the last three decades, Nepal’s 
economy and demography remain fundamentally agrarian (Figure 1). Sixty six percent of the 
country’s population is directly employed in agriculture, and nearly 90% live in rural areas (IRIN 
2012). Agricultural production is predominantly subsistence-oriented: seventy eight percent of 
farm households produce primarily for family consumption, while only one percent produce 
entirely for sale (USAID 2008).  Farmers generally practice traditional low input agricultural 
methods and participate in communal labor sharing networks. Most grow subsistence crops such 
as rice, maize, and lentils, and trade mostly through local marketing channels. Road connections 
have reached many parts of the country only recently, while other areas still lack any road access 
whatsoever. 
Figure 1. Nepal: Population (1960-2012)   
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
 
Regardless of the predominance of traditional farming practices, however, many Nepali 
farmers are finding it increasingly difficult to subsist. Rapid population growth and stifled land 
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reform have led to a significant fragmentation of farmers’ land holdings: from 1961 to 2001, the 
average farm size fell by 28%. Nearly half of all farmers now have access to no more than 0.5 
hectares of land, while a further 23% work as landless rural laborers (Table 1) (USAID 2008). 
While traditional farmers employ advanced terrace farming and water diversion methods to 
maximize yields under severe resource constraints, further gains to be had from the current 
methods are minimal.  
The fragmentation of land holdings is 
only one of many factors constraining rural 
development in Nepal. Fragile mountain 
ecosystems suffer from frequent landslides, 
and weather patterns are growing more irregular 
and destructive as climate change alters glacial 
melt and weather formation in the Himalayas 
(Gentle and Maraseni 2012).  Rural development 
has been consistently neglected in development 
and aid initiatives (Sharma 2006). Finally, political instability has disrupted development across 
much of the country. A peasant-backed Maoist insurgency–itself a product of rural stagnation 
and impoverishment–waged war against the Nepali state from 1996 to 2006, leaving 15,000 
Nepalese dead and over 100,000 internally displaced (Jha 2014).    
The result of these demographic, environmental, and political forces has been the flat-
lining of agricultural productivity since the 1980s (Figure 2). While Nepal enjoyed the highest 
levels of agricultural productivity in South Asia during the 1960s, it has since fallen behind its 
neighbors and now has the lowest agricultural productivity in the region (Dhakal 2011).  
Table 1. Nepal: Average Land Holdings 
Size of 
Holding 
(Hectares) 
Percent of 
Population 
< 0.2 18.2 
0.2-0.5 29.1 
0.5-1.0 27.4 
1.0-2.0 17.6 
2.0-3.0 4.7 
3.0-4.0 1.5 
4.0-5.0 0.6 
5.0-10.0 0.6 
> 10.0 0.1 
Source: Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2006 
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Figure 2. South and Southeast Asia: Agricultural Productivity from 1980-2013 (Value-
added per Agricultural Worker in Constant 2005 $US, Indexed to 1980)               
 
   Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
 
High rates of population growth (2.3% annually), coupled with stagnating agricultural 
productivity, have dragged down overall economic growth and complicated efforts to reduce 
poverty and malnutrition in the Nepali countryside (FAO 2010).  The country’s poor growth 
outcomes are clear when compared with other South Asian and comparable Southeast Asian 
countries. Although Nepal has experienced positive growth in per capita GDP since 1960, it 
remains the poorest country in one of the world’s poorest regions (Figure 3)  
Figure 3. South and Southeast Asia: GDP per capita (1960-2013) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 
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Furthermore, this poverty is not evenly distributed. Rates of growth in urban areas have 
more than kept pace with growing urban populations, leading to increasing levels of wealth and 
conspicuous consumption in larger cities. At the same time, limited infrastructure and 
commercial opportunities, as well as lack of access to agricultural inputs or extension services, 
has hampered rural development (Deraniyagala 2005). Reflecting these limitations, growth in 
real GDP for Nepal’s agricultural sector averaged only 2.6% annually between 1966 and 2002, 
while growth in the non-agricultural sector averaged 4.9% (Table 2). 
Table 2. 
Nepal: Real Growth in GDP (at 1985 prices) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sector 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-02 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Agriculture 2.9 1.7 -1.3 5.2 4.1 1.5 3.6 2.9 
Non-Agriculture 2.6 2.2 7.5 4.9 5.5 8.1 6.0 2.6 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Deraniyagala, 2005 
        
Beyond this rural/urban divergence, regional disparities remain large as well. Nepal is 
divided administratively into five “development regions,” each encompassing a north-to-south 
slice of the country. Poverty is highest in the Mid-Western Development Region, where 45% of 
the population lives below the poverty line, and lowest in the Central and Western Development 
Regions, where 27% live in poverty (Table 3) (Central Bureau of Statistics 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Nepal: Poverty by Region 
Region 
% of Population 
under National 
Poverty Line 
Eastern Development Region 29 
Central Development Region 27 
Western Development Region 27 
Mid-Western Development Region 45 
Far Western Development Region 41 
Urban 10 
Rural 35 
Total 31 
            Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 2006 
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 A growing population that is not accompanied by growing agricultural productivity will 
result inevitably in food shortages, as has been the case in Nepal. A structurally food deficit 
country, Nepal imported $US 177 million 
 worth of staple agricultural products in  
2013 (UN Comtrade 2015). These imports 
contributed to an increasing trend of food 
imports from abroad to make up for  
stagnating national production. As  
illustrated in Figure 4, food imports as a 
percentage of Nepal’s total merchandise  
imports have been rising steadily over the  
last fifty years, and in 2012 food imports constituted nearly 20% of the country’s total imported 
goods  Imports of staple crops (rice, maize, and wheat) have increased by a factor of ten since 
1994 in response to growing internal demand and stagnant national production (Figure 5) (UN 
Comtrade 2015). 
Figure 5. Nepal: Staple Food Imports (US$ Millions) 
 
 
       Source: UN Commodities Trading Database, 2015 
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Figure 4. Nepal: Food Share of Total Merchandise Imports 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2015 
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Under competitive market conditions, increased demand for agricultural products should 
raise prices enough to incentivize farmers to produce more, thus realigning supply and demand. 
In Nepal, however, structural limitations (such as a very limited supply of arable land) largely 
prevent farmers from responding to market signals in their production decisions (USAID 2008). 
Furthermore, functioning factor markets would allow unprofitable farmers to transition into non-
farm occupations, thus shifting land into the hands of more productive farmers. Nevertheless, 
many rural areas cannot provide non-farm employment at wages high enough for laborers to be 
able to afford the food imports that have replaced local production (FAO 2010). Consequently, 
while imports have substituted for declining domestic food supply at the national level, the 
micro-level distribution of this supply has been uneven and exclusive.  
 As a result of this rural market failure, rates of malnutrition in Nepal are strikingly high 
(Figure 6). Among children aged 0 to 5, 49.3% suffer from stunting due to severe malnutrition. 
This early-childhood malnourishment leads to diminished lifetime earning and learning potential, 
thus constituting a significant handicap to future development in Nepal (FAO 2010).  
Figure 6. Nepal: Malnutrition in Rural and Urban Areas 
 
Source: FAO 2010 
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In short, current socioeconomic conditions in rural Nepal are unsustainable. Development 
failure has already led to a civil war (1996-2006) that left nearly 15,000 Nepalese dead and over 
100,000 internally displaced.  And persistent malnutrition is stunting the life-possibilities of the 
next generations of Nepali farmers.  Due to increasingly irregular weather, degraded 
environmental conditions, and the fragmentation of land holdings, even traditional subsistence 
farmers are increasingly unable to produce sufficient quantities of food to support themselves.  
 
Introducing Innovations: High Value Vegetables 
In the context of this flat-lining agricultural growth and increasing population pressure, 
numerous governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are working to introduce 
new innovations into Nepal’s agrarian economy. The government’s Agricultural Perspectives 
Plan, first published in 1996, outlined a broad agenda of trade liberalization, commercialization, 
infrastructure expansion, and public-private partnership (Sugden 2009). Since this time, 
prominent NGOs including the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have focused on–among other approaches–diversifying farmers’ crop portfolios 
through the promotion of “high value vegetables” for commercial sale and export. According to 
a USAID country analysis of Nepal:  
 
“The main focus of USAID's agricultural programs has been to contribute to the strategic 
objective of increased sustainable production and sales of high-value agricultural products. A 
shift to high value agriculture uniquely matches the need to take pressure off the intensively 
irrigated cereals and enlarging small holder farmers' opportunities to benefit from expanding 
domestic and export markets (USAID 2008).” 
 
Similarly, the World Bank’s country report on Nepal notes that it aims to integrate farmers into 
“profitable market-oriented agricultural activities… targeted towards export (World Bank 2014).” 
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  According to this analysis, Nepal (due to its unique geography) possesses a comparative 
advantage in the production of vegetable crops relative to the growing Indian market to its south.  
These crops, if marketed effectively, can yield higher profits on smaller landholdings, thus 
improving both agricultural productivity and standards of living.  Up to 15% of farmers in some 
districts are now coupling small-scale commercial vegetable production with their staple crop 
production (USAID 2008).   
Nevertheless, the approach faces significant obstacles to broader adoption. Limited 
access to roads and markets makes the production of vegetable crops (which are especially 
vulnerable to spoilage and damage) difficult and risky. Furthermore, these high-value crops 
require increased inputs, including chemical fertilizers and improved irrigation equipment, thus 
creating potential barriers to entry for farmers without the ability to access credit or capital.
 
Overdependence on commercial farming could leave farmers at the whim of international price 
swings, making the adoption of vegetables a risky endeavor. Finally, the small scale of most 
Nepali farms could mean farmers are unable to take advantage of economies of scale in their 
commercial production.  
The degree to which these limitations (of scale, risk, and physical and human capital) 
affect the adoption of high-value vegetable crops will determine the prospects of these new 
“technologies” in improving agricultural productivity and rural livelihoods in Nepal.  Therefore, 
building a robust empirical understanding of the ways these constraints shape the adoption and 
effectiveness of vegetable cropping is integral to improving the country’s development outcomes. 
To this end, the remainder of this study focuses on applying methods from the literature on 
technology adoption to evaluate current constraints on the adoption of vegetable cultivation in 
Nepal’s Mid-Western Development Region. 
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3. Theories of Agricultural Development and Technology Adoption 
I begin this section by exploring some of the foundational ideas and debates in the field 
of agricultural development. This brief review is intended to contextualize and justify my focus 
on farmers’ micro-level adoption decisions. I follow this review with a discussion of the 
economics of technology adoption itself, and I conclude by analyzing the effects of scale 
economies, risk aversion, and capital constraints on the adoption process. 
Agricultural development first received serious attention from economists in the 1950s 
and 60s, as independence movements across Africa and Asia brought issues of global poverty 
and development into focus (Barrett, Carter, and Timmer 2010). Early scholarship during this 
period, characterized by the work of W. Arthur Lewis, focused on the “modernization” of 
traditional farming (Ellis and Biggs 2001). Lewis argued that traditional agriculture–typified by 
small landholdings, labor-intensive inputs, and production for subsistence–was irrational and 
backwards, and that the transition to large-scale mechanized monoculture would precipitate the 
“structural transformation” of a developing nation’s economy. This transformation would occur 
through what came to be called “Lewis linkages,” by which the scaling-up of farm production 
would free labor to move from the low-productivity agricultural sector to higher-productivity 
manufacturing (Lewis, 1954). In 1961, Johnston and Mellor posited further linkages between 
agricultural and industrial development (Barrett, Carter, and Timmer 2010). Through “Johnston-
Mellor linkages,” a country’s agricultural sector provided raw materials to supply urban workers, 
a domestic market for industrial output, and agricultural exports to earn the foreign exchange 
necessary to fund capital imports. Thus, agricultural and industrial development went hand in 
hand, each fortifying the other and lifting the country out of poverty (Johnston and Mellor 1961). 
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Both Lewis and Johnston and Mellor based their analyses of structural transformation 
upon the assumption of increasing returns to scale in developing country agriculture. They 
assumed that larger farms would deploy capital-intensive technological inputs more often and 
more effectively than smaller farms, bringing about the type of productivity gains seen 
previously in the United States and Western Europe. Challenging this assumption of increasing 
returns to scale, Theodore Schultz’s 1964 work, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, argued 
that, contrary to Lewis’ assumption, small farmers were in fact highly rational and efficient users 
of scarce inputs. According to Schultz, decisions that initially appeared irrational (such as 
traditional farmers’ reluctance to adopt profitable technologies) could in reality be optimal under 
conditions of constrained credit and food insecurity. Farmers, he concluded, were risk averse and 
“poor but efficient (Schultz 1964).” 
Schultz’s theory repositioned small farmers at the center of efforts to increase agricultural 
productivity and foster industrialization (Ellis and Biggs 2001). Rather than working to phase out 
traditional farmers in favor of larger commercial enterprises, policymakers now sought to 
remove constraints on small farm productivity growth in order to propel farmers out of potential 
“poverty traps” by providing credit, crop insurance, and subsidized inputs (Azariadus and 
Stachurski 2005; Barrett 2005). Schultz’s later work highlighted the role of human capital 
development in agriculture, emphasizing the importance of education (whether through formal 
schooling or on-the-job training) for productivity gains (Schultz 1975, 1978). Critically, however, 
economists following Schultz’s framework have noted that, given the a priori efficiency of small 
farmers, improvements in education may fail to revolutionize productivity without 
accompanying improvements in technology and infrastructure (Huffman 2001; Norton 2010). 
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Schultz’s “poor but efficient” hypothesis supported the empirical findings emerging from 
Amartya Sen’s contemporary research on Indian agriculture (Sen 1962, 1966). Analyzing the 
relationship between yields per hectare and farm size among Indian farms, Sen had detected an 
“inverse relationship” (IR) between farm size and land productivity.1 That is, small farmers 
appeared to produce more per hectare than did large farmers. Sen posited that smaller farms 
using primarily family labor avoided the costly supervision of less-efficient hired labor, and had 
a tendency to work their limited land holdings more intensively due to the low opportunity costs 
of their labor (Thapa 2007). Sen’s findings had clear implications for the debate over land reform 
that was sweeping Latin America and South Asia at the time. Proponents of pro-poor land reform 
seized upon Sen’s conclusion as evidence that redistribution would improve land productivity, 
while early proponents of the coming Green Revolution countered that the IR would reverse as 
farmers adopted scale-biased and capital-intensive technologies such as tractors (Lipton 1993; 
Dyer 2003). While economists remain undecided over the status of the IR in the post-Green 
Revolution era, Sen’s findings still have relevance in countries such as Nepal where traditional 
agriculture remains the norm. 
“Poor but efficient” theories, otherwise referred to as “small farm first,” fit well into the 
pro-market development paradigm that reigned supreme during the 1980s and 90s and that 
continues to exert a strong influence on policy to this day (Ellis and Biggs 2001). Pushed most 
prominently by the World Bank and other international donor institutions, the “neoliberal” 
development agenda conceives of small farmers as micro-entrepreneurs who can lift themselves 
                                                          
1
 The Russian economist Aleksandr Chayanov (1888-1937) was the first to develop a coherent model of farm 
household decision-making, from which he derived a prediction of the inverse relationship (Barrett, Carter, and 
Timmer 2010). Chayanov argued that households with smaller land endowments faced a lower shadow price of 
labor and thus “purchased” labor more intensively in proportion to land, yielding higher production outcomes 
(Chayanov, 1965). Sen’s later empirical work in India confirmed Chayanov’s theorization. 
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out of poverty if only markets are made to function properly (Sugden, 2009). The Bank argues 
that, at the macro level, agricultural commercialization for export will allow poor agrarian 
countries to exploit their comparative advantages in labor-intensive goods and generate foreign 
exchange with which to offset structural debt imbalances. At the micro level, the facilitation of 
market participation through infrastructure improvements, microcredit, and trade liberalization 
will incentivize farmers to invest in productive technologies, thus spurring development (World 
Development Report 2007). Central to the World Bank’s market-driven approach is the 
introduction and effective adoption of improved techniques and technologies in developing 
country agriculture.  
 Critics of the neoliberal approach counter that, in practice, the commercialization of 
traditional agriculture removes valuable farmland from domestic food production in precisely 
those countries most often suffering from food insecurity (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010). 
Particularly in South Asia, troubled memories of colonial-era policies that enforced grain exports 
even during times of devastating internal famine complicate and color the otherwise cold 
economic logic of the reformers (Davis 2000). Furthermore, critics argue that the World Bank’s 
one-size-fits-all application of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem commits the “fallacy of composition” 
by urging all developing countries to export similar low-value primary products, resulting in 
falling prices and evaporating markets (Glenn 2008). Finally, the World Bank’s critics contend, 
marketization’s reliance on scale-biased technologies could inadvertently favor larger farmers 
and exacerbate rural inequalities and landlessness (Barrett, Carter, and Timmer 2010).  
In sum, the field of agricultural development economics has been characterized by vibrant 
experimentation and debate over the last half century.  Despite the volume of evidence and 
arguments produced across the board, major areas of contention remain, including: 
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 The role of backward and forward linkages between agriculture and industrialization, and 
the ways (if any) in which agricultural development fosters “structural transformation.” 
 The existence of an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity, and the 
implications of this relationship for land and market reform. 
 The relative merits and disadvantages of agricultural commercialization and liberalization 
versus state-led development, and the role that political and social discourses may have to 
play in the realm of the “economic.” 
Superseding the divisions in current agricultural development scholarship, however, is a 
broad consensus on the importance of rural technology transfer as a means of stimulating 
agrarian economies, improving access to food in areas suffering from malnutrition, and targeting 
benefits to marginalized populations (Godfray 2009). Accordingly, I turn in the following section 
to a description of the economics of technology adoption in developing country agriculture. 
  
3.1 The Role of Technology Adoption  
 Modern growth theories identify technological progress (whether exogenous or 
endogenous) as the engine of growth (Solow 1956; Romer 1994; Jones and Vollrath 2013). But 
agriculture, by its nature as a geographically dispersed, low-density activity, does not typically 
generate high rates of technological innovation on its own. University, government, and private-
sector research services are the primary sources of agricultural innovations, which they then 
market to farmers through extension services. In the case of developing countries, however, 
research institutions may be poorly funded or nonexistent. Innovations imported from abroad 
may not be locally appropriate. And even where appropriate, extension services may not 
effectively transmit innovations to farmers (Norton 2010).  
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 As a result, technological progress–the engine of growth–is irregular and unpredictable in 
rural economies, characterized by incomplete adoption of new technologies and partially 
functioning markets and price mechanisms (Barrett, Carter, and Timmer 2010). The stochastic 
arrival of foreign technologies in agricultural areas creates a constant disequilibrium in which 
farmers struggle to stay on the “technology treadmill.” Coined by Willard Cochrane in 1958, the 
“treadmill” refers to the dynamic effects of an exogenous technology shock on farmers’ 
wellbeing. Farmers, Cochrane argued, are distributed across three categories: “early adopters,” 
“followers,” and “laggards (Sunding and Zilberman 2001).” The relatively small group of early 
adopters is predisposed (whether through lower risk profiles, superior information, etc.) to adopt 
a new cost-cutting or return-increasing technology, and thus earns large profits. But as the large 
group of followers catches on and adopts the new innovation, the market price falls (especially 
for products will low elasticity of demand), reducing their profits. Followers, therefore, may gain 
or lose from the innovation. Finally, the laggards adopt last (after prices have fallen due to 
increased supply) or do not adopt at all. In either case, they earn lower returns on their output and 
are worse off because of the new technology. Thus, on the whole, Cochrane predicted that 
technological innovations may have limited or no benefits to farmers.  The reduction in prices 
due to the innovation ultimately benefits consumers, who face lower prices at the food market 
(Cochrane 1979; Sunding and Zilberman 2001). Since the wealthiest farmers are likely to be 
early adopters while marginalized producers may be laggards, the logic of the technology 
treadmill suggests that technological innovations may increase rural inequalities (Feder 1985). 
 In cases where farmers’ final output good enjoys perfectly elastic demand, however, 
Cochrane’s pessimistic prediction may not hold. Perfect elasticity implies that the increase in 
supply resulting from the technology shock would not reduce prices and undercut profits among 
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followers and laggards as it does in Cochrane’s model. This may be the case if a relatively small 
producer country has access to a large export market able to absorb nearly any quantity of the 
good with minimal effect on prices (Sunding and Zilberman 2001). This result is significant in 
the context of the current study. Due to Nepal’s privileged access to the enormous market for 
vegetables in northern India, broad expansion of vegetable production among Nepali farmers is 
unlikely to cause significant reductions in export prices (USAID 2008). Consequently, all three 
categories of farmers (early adopters, followers, and laggards) stand to benefit from the adoption 
of high value vegetables, and the negative inequality effects may be less pronounced than would 
otherwise be the case.  
 In the developing country context, Cochrane’s simple technology adoption framework is 
further complicated by incomplete markets, inaccessible inputs, and information asymmetries. 
Small farmers may be efficient maximizers of yields under severe resource constraints, but their 
technology adoption behaviors often contradict simple market logics and reveal market failures.  
These contradictions are both what make farmers’ decision-making interesting, and what make 
this decision-making an essential element of policy analysis. To implement effective rural 
development policy, we must first untangle the complexities of farmers’ technology adoption 
decisions at the micro level. 
 Studies attempting to untangle this adoption process focus on explanatory variables that 
generally fall into three broad categories. First, many studies follow in Sen’s footsteps by 
examining the impacts of farm size and economies or diseconomies of scale on the adoption of 
new technologies (Croppenstedt, Demeke, and Meschi 2003; Adesina, Baidu-Forson 1995; Feder 
1982). Secondly, researchers draw upon behavioral models and rural sociology to measure the 
impacts of risk aversion and behavior under uncertainty on technology adoption (Dercon and 
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Christiaensen 2007; Abadi Ghadim et al. 2003; Feder 1985). Thirdly, many studies follow 
Schultz’s emphasis on the importance of human capital by measuring the impacts of education, 
extension, and learning by doing, as well as physical capital and credit, on overcoming or 
creating barriers to adoption (Abdulai and Huffman 2005; Abadi Ghadim et al. 2003; Hojo 2002; 
Sunding and Zilberman 2001; D’Souza, Cyphers, and Phipps 1993)  
 The majority of the studies cited above employ regression analysis to isolate associations 
between focus variables and adoption behavior in farm-level data sets. More recent scholarship 
on technology adoption, however, has critiqued this reliance on regression analysis due to its 
inability to establish causal links between dependent and explanatory variables (Angrist and 
Pischke 2009). Contemporary analysts have thus turned to instrumental variable methods, natural 
experiments, and randomized controlled trials to isolate causal relationships between farmer 
characteristics and adoption behavior (Dupas 2014; Devoto and Duflo et al, 2012).  
 Despite differences in methodological approach, however, contemporary technology 
adoption studies continue to focus on the three categories outlined above–scale, risk, and capital. 
The following sections explore the economic dynamics of these three phenomena in turn. 
 
3.1.1 Economies and Diseconomies of Scale 
Farm size is often a central variable of focus for studies of technology adoption in 
agriculture. A farm’s size typically reveals important information regarding the farmers’ wealth, 
education, and access to resources and information. However, the nature of the technology being 
introduced (whether it is lumpy or divisible, scale-neutral or scale-biased, etc.) can also affect 
adoption in significant ways, thus producing potentially confounding effects (Feder 1985). In this 
section I first explore the effect of large and small farmers’ personal characteristics on the 
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adoption decision, and then examine the ways in which the nature of the technology itself may 
complicate the decision-making process. 
 Large farmers tend to be wealthier than small ones. Large farmers can leverage 
landholdings as collateral for loans, enabling them to overcome high fixed costs of adoption (the 
purchase of a tractor, for example). On the contrary, smaller farmers’ lack of land and other 
assets may prevent them from obtaining credit.  Thus, wealth-biased access to capital may lead 
to differential rates of adoption between large and small farms (Barrett, Carter, Timmer 2010).  
 Furthermore, large farmers may have larger food reserves or savings, giving them 
increased capacity for risk. They may also (due to differential levels of wealth and access) have 
more education than small farmers. Due to their larger size and market share, they may possess 
improved market information and marketing contacts (Feder 1985). As a result of these 
advantages, larger farmers are often more likely to adopt new technologies than are smaller 
farmers. 
 On the other hand, small farmers typically have higher ratios of family labor to land area 
(more people packed on to little land) and thus have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive, 
high-returns products. In contrast, larger farmers have a lower family-size to land ratio, and thus 
have a comparative advantage in land-intensive products. By this argument, smaller farmers are 
more disposed to adopt a labor-intensive innovation than are large farmers (Ellis and Biggs 
2001). Large farmers would optimally adopt the labor-intensive, high returns product as well, but 
may be limited by failures in the labor market that create labor bottlenecks (Feder 1985). For 
instance, Harriss’ 1972 study of Indian farmers found that labor shortages explained much of the 
failure to adopt a new high-yielding crop variety. 
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 Evidently, the nature of the new technology plays a decisive role in defining patterns of 
adoption. The labor-intensiveness of new crop varieties may shape which farmers find it optimal 
to adopt. Similarly, technologies that enjoy economies of scale will favor adoption by large 
farmers, while technologies exhibiting decreasing returns to scale may favor small farmers. 
Lumpy technologies, such as tractors or irrigation systems, require a significant fixed cost 
of adoption and cannot be phased in gradually. In this case, Weil (1970) predicted that credit 
constraints could prevent smaller farmers from adopting, even if they wished to. Alternatively, 
divisible technologies such as high-yielding crop varieties can be adopted gradually and for low 
fixed costs. Thus, divisible technologies allow small farmers to overcome both credit and risk 
constraints, since they can adopt only as much of the technology as their liquidity allows and use 
trial plots to assess risk without overexposing themselves (Sunding and Zilberman 2001). 
Nevertheless, some economists argue that even divisible technologies may require substantial 
fixed startup costs, including the cost of learning new methods and locating new markets. These 
factors may reduce small farms’ adoption rates (Feder 1985). 
Empirically, Schluter (1971) and Sharma (1973) found that smaller farmers in India 
adopted high-yielding varieties more readily and in larger proportions than did large farmers, and 
Adesina and Baidu-Forson (1995) found that farm size had a negative impact on adoption rates 
of improved sorghum varieties in West Africa. In contrast, Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya (1998) 
found that rates and proportions of hybrid maize production in Malawi increased with farm size. 
In sum, the effects of farm size on technology adoption depend on the specific nature of the 
technology and the characteristics of the farmers in the study sample. 
The preceding theoretical review yields a number of conditional predictions of the effects 
of farm size on vegetable adoption. These predictions are summarized in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4. Predictions of Scale Effects on Vegetable Adoption 
Conditional upon whether vegetables in Nepal: 
 Are a lumpy or divisible technology 
 Are more or less labor-intensive than staple crops 
 Produce higher or lower yields and profits than staple crops 
 Are more or less risky than staple crops (exhibit larger or 
smaller variance in input requirements and returns) 
 Exhibit increasing, decreasing, or neutral returns to scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Uncertainty and Risk Aversion 
Farming in developing countries is typically a risky business. Access to crop insurance is 
often limited or nonexistent. Unpredictable weather patterns and faulty infrastructure make crop 
production and marketing anything but certain. Supply prices (seeds, fertilizers) vary 
dramatically between growing seasons. Hired labor supplies can evaporate at critical moments 
such as planting and harvest times. Some of these sources of risk (such as adverse weather 
 
Two contradictory predictions emerge: 
 Larger farmers will be 
more likely to adopt 
high yielding vegetables 
because of differential 
access to capital, 
markets, information, 
liquidity, food security, 
education, and other 
resources 
Or 
 Smaller farmers will be more 
likely to adopt labor-intensive 
vegetables in order to 
optimize the use of their 
limited land and relatively 
large family labor supply, 
while large farmers will find 
themselves constrained by 
labor shortages 
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conditions) affect farmers whether or not they adopt new technologies. In other cases, the new 
technology brings new risks and uncertainties of its own (Barrett, Carter, and Timmer 2010).  
High yielding varieties (HYVs) often present higher risk and higher reward than staple 
crops such as rice or maize. That is, average profits are higher with HYVs, but variance in profits 
is higher as well (Zeller et al., 1998). Thus, farmers may be hesitant to adopt new crops until they 
are able to observe the outcomes on neighboring farms or on a demonstration plot. This suggests 
that agricultural training may be a key element in reducing farmers’ perceptions of risk from new 
crop varieties (Feder 1985). 
A central source of new risk from HYVs emerges from farmers’ increased exposure to 
the market upon adoption. Developing country farmers typically produce to meet family needs, 
and engage only in small-scale marketing of their surplus production. In contrast, HYVs are 
typically cash crops that require farmers to commercialize their production in return for higher 
earnings (Norton 2010). The result is that an increased proportion of the farmer’s crop portfolio 
is exposed to market uncertainties. Particularly in isolated rural areas with limited transportation 
infrastructure and communications technology, crop retail markets are likely to be fragmented 
and incomplete. The result is that prices vary wildly from season to season and even hour to hour, 
and are often entirely uncorrelated with national or global commodity prices (USAID 2008). 
Furthermore, if HYV supply chains are designed for export, farmers are held hostage to 
international prices, which may be much lower due to competition from more competitive 
agricultural sectors in other parts of the world (Norton 2010).  
 Farmers’ marketing situation may be further complicated by the nature of the high value 
crop. In the case of vegetables, spoilage can occur within a few days of harvest, meaning that 
farmers must sell their crop almost immediately upon harvest, regardless of prevailing prices. In 
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contrast, rice and maize can be stockpiled until prices are favorable. Vegetable buyers, aware 
that farmers’ products will spoil rapidly if unsold, can extort abusively low prices. Farmers 
typically respond by forming marketing collectives in which entire villages elect a representative 
to bargain for them, thus achieving a more even bargaining position vis a vis buyers (Norton 
2010). However, when a HYV is new to an area and still has few adopters, farmers suffer from a 
first adopter’s disadvantage: adopters cannot form a marketing collective until a critical mass of 
farmers have adopted, but no farmers wish to adopt until that critical mass has already formed. 
This coordination failure means that adoption often follows spatial patterns, with certain villages 
exhibiting nearly universal adoption while others exhibit none (Feder 1985). 
 A final crop-specific risk factor plaguing high value vegetables is that their input-
intensive nature means farmers must invest more labor and capital upfront, before knowing what 
the price will be at the point of sale. Growing less input-intensive crops would be safer since 
investment is reduced relative to an unpredictable payoff. 
 As a result of such significant risk from market exposure and the lack of insurance 
products to address it, risk averse farmers may find themselves locked into “poverty traps” in 
which their optimal risk-adjusted decisions involve avoiding new technologies and continuing 
less-productive traditional subsistence practices. In the event of a poverty trap, improved training 
and education and improved access to credit and crop insurance can change farmers’ incentive 
structures and increase adoption (Dercon and Christiaensen 2007). 
 While most farmers in the developing country context are risk averse, specific levels of 
risk aversion may vary according to farmer characteristics. Farmers with access to credit, large 
food reserves, or opportunities for off-farm income (proxied by education) may be more 
disposed to take risks than farmers lacking these advantages. Since many of these characteristics 
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often coincide with large farms, large farms are typically considered to be less risk averse than 
smaller farms (Feder 1985). Alternatively, if profits from the new technology are sufficiently 
higher than the increased variance in returns, smaller farmers may adopt more quickly than large 
farmers in order to diversify their production portfolios (Just and Zilberman 1983). 
 Empirical studies have employed a range of models and methods to assess the role of risk 
in technology adoption. Lindner (1980) employed a Bayesian learning model to assess adoption 
over time and found that farmers often first adopt small trial plots before adopting on a larger 
scale. Demir (1976) reported that farmers in Turkey were more likely to adopt if they had 
previously interacted with extension agents, which reduced their levels of uncertainty. Abadi 
Ghadim et al. (2005) surveyed farmers in Western Australia and found that farmers’ perceptions 
of a new technology’s (in this case, chickpeas) riskiness was a strong explanator of adoption 
behavior. Finally, Dercon and Christiaensen (2007) searched for risk-driven poverty traps in 
Ethiopia and found that risk aversion among small farmers did, in some cases, result in sub-
optimal decision-making.  
 The theoretical and empirical findings discussed above generate a number of predictions 
for the adoption of vegetables in Nepal: 
Table 5. Predictions of Risk Effects on Vegetable Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Larger or wealthier farmers may be less risk averse and thus 
more disposed to adopting riskier vegetables 
 Farmers with better access to education and agricultural 
training will be more likely to adopt, since information 
reduces uncertainty 
 Farmers with better access to markets and agricultural 
suppliers will be able to produce and market vegetables more 
easily, thus reducing the risk of production for the market 
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3.1.3 Physical and Human Capital 
Beginning with Schultz’s original work on human capital in the 1960s (Schultz 1964), 
many studies of technology adoption have focused on the role of education, experience, training, 
and other forms of human capital in the adoption process. Additionally, many studies search for 
the presence of credit and capital constraints, especially in the context of lumpy technologies 
such as tractors or irrigation pumps. In this section I will evaluate both human and physical 
capital as determinants of technology adoption. 
Education is essential to understanding adoption behavior. Farmers with higher levels of 
education strategize more effectively, take advantage of new technologies and methods, and 
make sounder farming decisions. The majority of farmers in the developing country context may 
not receive education beyond primary school. Thus, primary school–which teaches essential 
skills such as literacy and numeracy–is the key threshold education level (Huffman 2001). 
Higher education, especially university education, may or may not contribute directly to 
increases in farm productivity, but does typically give farmers useful business contacts and a 
better understanding of the broader regional or national economic climate (Huffman 2001). Thus, 
education is likely to be positively associated with technology adoption. 
Experience is also an essential component in farming practice. Nevertheless, it is unclear 
whether older farmers (using age as a proxy for experience) would be more likely to adopt due to 
a fuller understanding of agricultural practice, or younger farmers, who may be more disposed to 
change and who have a longer time to enjoy the increased profits from any new technological 
innovation (Becker 1993). 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) posit that changing farming conditions (irregular weather 
patterns, new technologies, etc.) increase the returns to education, since educated farmers are 
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more able to adapt to dynamic challenges and opportunities. Their work parallels Cochrane’s 
theory of the “technology treadmill” by predicting that more educated farmers may be the “early 
adopters” who most benefit from technological change. 
 Education may also raise the opportunity cost of a farmers’ on-farm employment, 
potentially drawing off the most productive workers through migration. This has been the case in 
Nepal, where educated rural workers travel to urban centers or migrate internationally in search 
of better wages and mobility. These labor flows could result in a “brain drain” from the 
countryside, or a key skill-upgrading process if migrant workers return to their farms with 
knowledge and contacts from the outside world (Norton 2010). 
Physical capital is essential to reduce labor bottlenecks in areas where labor markets are 
incomplete (Feder 1985). However, limited liquidity and credit may constrain farmers wishing to 
purchase new capital technologies, especially if these technologies are indivisible. Nevertheless, 
Schutjer and Van der Veen (1977) argue that the potential profits from HYVs are often high 
enough to convince the smallest farmers to phase into adoption of this divisible technology. 
Ram’s research in India (1976) confirmed the importance of human capital in agriculture 
by measuring a positive relationship between education and productivity and a negligible 
relationship between labor inputs and productivity while controlling for education. Furthermore, 
Rosenzweig (1978) reported that the likelihood of HYV adoption in the Punjab was positively 
related to level of education (Feder 1985). More recently, Abdulai and Huffman (2005) found a 
positive relationship between adoption of cross-bred cow technology in Tanzania and schooling, 
access to credit, and access to agricultural training services. 
The evidence above suggests the following predictions regarding vegetable adoption: 
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Table 6. Predictions of Capital Effects on Vegetable Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Education will be positively associated with vegetable 
adoption, since educated farmers possess superior 
information and improved understanding of technological 
possibilities 
 Farmers controlling more physical capital will be more likely 
to adopt input-intensive vegetable crops, since physical 
capital relieves labor bottlenecks 
 Agricultural training should increase adoption rates 
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4. Data and Definition of Variables 
 The dataset employed in this study comes from a survey conducted by the author in Mid-
Western Nepal during the months of June and July, 2014. Surveys were administered 
individually to 83 farmers across 13 Village Development Committees
2
 (VDCs) in the Mid-
Western districts of Surkhet, Bardiya, and Dang (Figure 7). Five observations were found to be 
statistical outliers and were removed from the dataset before analysis. The district of Surkhet is 
in the mid-hills region, whereas Bardiya and parts of Dang lie in the Tarai lowlands. Together, 
these three districts offer a representative sample of environments and agricultural systems in 
Nepal’s Mid-Western Development Region (MWDR).  
 
Figure 7. Research Sites in Nepal’s Mid-Western Development Region 
 
                                                          
2
 Village Development Committees are the smallest administrative unit in Nepal. Each VDC contains numerous 
villages. Thus, each surveyed VDC in our sample represents a snapshot of multiple villages. 
Kathmandu 
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The survey was conducted under the auspices of Winrock International and USAID’s 
Knowledge-based Integrated Sustainable Agriculture and Nutrition (KISAN) project. All 
surveyed farmers were voluntary participants in the KISAN agricultural training program. Thus, 
while farmers were selected randomly from among the pool of KISAN participants, the 
underlying decision to participate in the program may correlate with farmers’ decision-making as 
revealed in the survey. This non-random selection could potentially result in a “simultaneity bias,” 
as postulated in Zeller et al. (1998). Consequently, descriptive statistics from the survey sample 
may not necessarily reflect the statistics of the region’s general population as a whole. We can 
partially control for this selected sample bias by controlling for the variable “agtraining,” which 
measured survey participants’ degree of participation in KISAN agricultural trainings. Levels of 
participation ranged from 0 to 10 trainings among surveyed farmers. Presumably, controlling in 
regressions for the degree of farmers’ participation in the KISAN program will reduce the 
biasing effect of a selected sample. 
 The survey (see Survey Appendices for full reproductions of the field surveys in both 
English and Nepali language) focused on measuring farmers’ costs and returns to production for 
specific crops over a single growing season.
3
 The survey decomposed costs of production into 
labor costs, capital costs, costs of credit, and opportunity costs of land and investment. Revenues 
and profits were calculated using the retail price obtained by the farmer at the point of sale (see 
Appendix A for a detailed accounting of the calculations involved in arriving at farmers’ costs 
and returns to crop production). Each observation in the survey details the costs and returns for a 
single crop grown by the farmer over a single growing season. All farmers growing vegetable 
crops were surveyed about the vegetable crop they were growing. Thus, those farmers appearing 
                                                          
3
 Surveyed vegetable crops included: Tomatoes, Cauliflower, Cucumber, Bitter Gourd, Cabbage, Onion, and Chili. 
Surveyed staple crops included: Maize, Lentils, and Rice. 
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in the survey as cultivators of maize, lentils, or rice were not involved in vegetable cultivation. 
Farmers reporting vegetable cultivation in the survey, however, were nearly always cultivating a 
staple crop as well. Because of this mutual exclusivity, the survey data can be used to analyze the 
factors influencing a farmer’s decision of whether or not to adopt vegetables. 
 The survey also collected data on the characteristics of participants’ farms, as well as 
demographic and geographic information. Data on farm characteristics included farm size, crop 
portfolios, tractor and pump use, and organic and chemical fertilizer application. Demographic 
data included farmers’ age, gender, ethnicity, level of education, family size, level of agricultural 
training, food security, access to credit, and household assets. Geographic information included 
district, VDC, ward, village, distance from drivable road, distance from market, and distance 
from agricultural supply store. Additional variables were calculated using the base variables 
described above. Additional variables included measures of farm productivity, costs, returns, and 
profits per hectare, and vegetable adoption behavior. Table 7 on the following page describes 
selected variables from the survey and shows basic descriptive statistics. 
 When evaluating the data that follow, a number of considerations should be made 
regarding potential sources of bias. First, the small sample size (n=83) suggests that random 
variation could skew the outcomes. Nevertheless, the Law of Large Numbers typically begins 
taking effect around n=40, implying that n=83 should be sufficiently large to draw meaningful 
conclusions. Secondly, some estimation error appears in the data as a result of farmers’ mis-
estimation. Many farmers in the survey had little formal education and found it difficult to give 
precise numerical estimates. This measurement error may cause attenuation bias, but there is no 
reason to believe that farmers consistently over- or under-estimated. Thus, estimation errors 
should cancel out, minimizing bias from this source.  
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Table 7. Variable Names, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name (regression variable)                               Variable Description 
Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Districts: 
           Bardiya 1 if farmer in Bardiya, 0 otherwise 0.36 
         Dang 1 if farmer in Dang, 0 otherwise 0.37 
         Surkhet 1 if farmer in Surkhet, 0 otherwise 0.27 
 Age (age) Head of Household's years of Age 36.8 11.98 
Gender (gender) Head of Household's gender, 1=male, 0=female 0.35 
 Family Size (familysize) Number of Family Members in Household 6.69 3.14 
Education (education) 1=illiterate, 2=informal, 3=primary, 4=secondary, 5=SLC, 
6=higher 3.50 1.69 
Ethnicity (highercaste) 1=member of higher caste group, 0 otherwise 0.31 
 Agricultural Training (agtraining) Number of agricultural training sessions attended 4.12 2.20 
Number of Assets (assets) Accumulation of assets including bullock, stove, electricity, etc. 6.27 2.17 
Distance to Road (distroad) Kilometers to nearest drivable road 1.16 1.59 
Distance to Market (distmarket) Kilometers to nearest market for goods being produced 5.35 4.73 
Dist. to Ag. Supplier (distagrovet) Minutes required to reach nearest agricultural supply store 62.9 68.41 
Farm Area (farmarea) Cultivable area of farm in ropani (1 ropani = 0.051 hectares) 11.84 11.26 
Food Security (foodsupply) 1=sufficient food for 0-6 months, 2=food for 6-9 months, 3=food 
for 9-12 months, 4=food for >12 months 3.05 0.90 
Crop under Cultivation (crop) Crop being cultivated for which survey data was collected 
  Area of Crop Cultivated (croparea) Ropani under cultivation of surveyed crop 6.06 10.30 
Tractor in Use (tractor) 1=tractor rented or owned by farmer, 0=otherwise 0.26 
 Motor Pump in Use (pump) 1=pump rented or owned by farmer, 0=otherwise 0.58 
 Revealed Access to Credit (credit) 1=farmer currently has loan, 0=currently without loan 0.62 
 Labor Cost per Ha. (laborcosthect) Labor hrs. expended in 1 season's cultivation of surveyed crop 
multiplied by local labor cost 82,013.9 86,985.50 
Capital Cost per Ha. (capitalcosthect) Cost of capital inputs for 1 season's cultivation of surveyed crop 49,360.9 39,030.90 
Total Cost per Ha. (costperhectare) Total cost for 1 season's cultivation of surveyed crop 144,444 120,483 
Cost per Kg. (costperkg) Total cost to produce one kg. of surveyed crop 19.74 12.25 
Capital Share of Total Cost (capshare) Proportion of total cost going to capital expenditures 0.39 0.17 
Labor Share of Total Cost (laborshare) Proportion of total cost going to labor expenditures 0.61 0.17 
Revenue per Ha. (revenuehect) Total earnings per hectare for surveyed crop  315,357 353,025 
Profit per Ha. (profithect) Gross margin per hectare for surveyed crop 170,784 285,163 
Labor Hours per Ha. (laborhrshect) Hours of labor invested in 1 season's production of surveyed crop 
(including both family and hired labor) 2,550.1 2,834.54 
Retail Price of Crop (retailprice) Price per kg. for surveyed crop received by farmer at point of sale 31.27 16.44 
Yield (kilos) Total kilograms of surveyed crop produced in season of survey 25,357.8 33,425.5 
Yield per Ha. (yieldhect) Kgs. of surveyed crop produced per hectare for surveyed season 9,065.44 7,537.56 
Yield per Expenditure (yieldcost) Kgs. of surveyed crop produced per 100 NRs invested 6.84 3.64 
Yield per Labor Hours (yieldhrs) Kgs. of surveyed crop produced per labor hour invested 5.63 5.24 
Fertilizer Use per Ha. (fertilizerperhect) Kgs. of chemical fertilizer applied per hectare for surveyed crop 204.14 665.8 
Physical Capital Index (physcapindex) Index ranging from 0 to 2 measuring intensity of physical capital 
use, 0=no physical capital use, 2=significant physical capital use 1.97 1.19 
Adoption of Vegetables (vegadopt) 1=vegetables adopted on farm, 0=vegetables not adopted 0.55 
 Share of Vegetables (shareofveg) Share of cultivable farm area dedicated to vegetable cultivation 0.08 0.14 
Price Differential (pricedifferential) Difference between veg. and staple retail prices in farmer's VDC 13.19 9.23 
Total Factor Productivity (tfp) Residual derived from Cobb-Douglas Production Function 2,425.63 2,487.65 
Relative TFP (relativetfp) Difference between farmer's TFP and TFP of other farmers in 
sample growing same crop type 0 1,538.6 
 
36 
 
Table 8 shows selected comparative descriptive statistics for farms growing vegetables versus 
staple crops. 
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The comparative statistics presented in Table 5 illustrate some basic differences between 
the average vegetable producer and average staple crop producer. Farmers producing vegetable 
crops tend to have smaller farm sizes (mean=9.3 ropani) than do farmers producing only staple 
crops (mean=14.9 ropani). Furthermore, vegetable producers dedicate much smaller plots to 
vegetable production than staple producers dedicate to staple crop production (1.1 ropani for 
vegetables versus 12.1 for staples). Vegetable producers are, on average, approximately one half 
hour closer to an agricultural supply store than are staple crop producers. Vegetable producers 
apply more fertilizer to their land (316.8 kg/hectare versus 65.7 kg./hectare for staples). 
Vegetable producers also earn on average 12.1 NRs more per kilogram at the point of sale. 
Finally, vegetable producers have on average attended one more agricultural training session 
than have staple producers.  
These findings suggest that substantial differences exist in the characteristics of vegetable 
and staple crop producers. The following section (Section 5) sets the stage for the analysis of 
these underlying patterns by evaluating the nature of vegetable crops according to the criteria 
identified in Section 3, Table 4. This section uses the survey data to establish a series of 
empirical facts that will serve to confirm or reject hypothetical explanations for the regression 
results presented in Section 7. 
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5. Vegetable Crops: Empirical Facts 
 As described in Section 3, Table 4, our predictions of vegetable adoption behavior are 
conditional upon qualities of the vegetable “technologies” themselves. Whether vegetables are 
lumpy or divisible determines whether access to credit is a significant constraint to adoption. 
And vegetables’ labor requirements, profitability, risk, and returns to scale relative to staple 
crops determine what type of farmer is likely to adopt them. In the following section I draw upon 
the dataset described in Section 4 above to derive six “empirical facts” regarding vegetable crops. 
These facts will condition and refine the hypotheses laid out in Tables 4, 5, and 6 of Section 3, 
and will sharpen the specificity of my predictions regarding vegetable adoption behavior. 
 
Fact 1. Vegetables are a Divisible Technology 
 Farmers cannot purchase technologies such as tractors or pumps in stages, but rather must 
have the liquidity or credit to overcome the large initial fixed cost of purchase. Thus, tractors and 
pumps are referred to as “lumpy” technologies. In contrast, hybrid seeds are a “divisible” 
technology since farmers can adopt any volume of them, from one seed to an entire field. In the 
case of divisible technologies, credit limitations are much less of a barrier to adoption.  
 Are vegetables a divisible or lumpy technology? At first glance, vegetables are akin to 
hybrid seeds in that farmers can adopt them at graduated scales. If, however, vegetable 
production requires the corresponding adoption of a fixed-cost technology such as an irrigation 
system, then vegetable crops could in fact be a “pseudo-lumpy” technology (Feder 1985). Thus, 
it is not immediately obvious whether vegetables should be a lumpy or divisible technology.  
Figure 8 illustrates the proportion of vegetable farmers’ farms dedicated to vegetable 
crops in the dataset. If vegetables were a lumpy technology, shares of vegetable cultivation 
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should exhibit a stepwise pattern across farms. Nevertheless, the share of farm area dedicated to 
vegetable crops rises smoothly, suggesting that vegetables are indeed a divisible technology. 
Figure 8. Proportion of Farm Area Dedicated to Vegetable Cultivation 
 
 
 The divisible nature of vegetable crops suggests that, while these crops may benefit from 
corresponding fixed-cost inputs such as irrigation, this correspondence does not appear to be a 
determining factor in the share of farmland that farmers dedicate to vegetable crops. Furthermore, 
vegetable divisibility suggests that access to credit should be a much less significant factor in 
predicting vegetable adoption than standard technology adoption theory would suggest. 
 
Fact 2. Vegetables are more Labor-Intensive than Staple Crops 
 The quantity of labor required to produce a crop is a key constraint on farm production in 
Mid-Western Nepal.  Labor markets are incomplete, and, in some areas, non-existent, as revealed 
by the very low use of hired labor in the sample (6 out of 78 farmers hired labor in 2014). 
Consequently, severe labor bottlenecks appear around labor-intensive periods such as planting 
and harvest. Farmers often participate in intra-family and intra-village labor sharing to overcome 
these bottlenecks. Nevertheless, if large farmers elect to plant too labor-intensive of a crop, they 
will be unable to volunteer sufficient quantities of labor on neighboring farms during down times 
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to secure their neighbors’ labor during their own harvesting and planting periods. Thus, the 
relative labor-intensity of vegetable crops relative to staple crops could affect which size of 
farmer is more likely to adopt which type of crop. 
 As illustrated in Table 9, staple and vegetable crops are relatively even in terms of labor 
hours required to produce one kilogram of output (with staple crops requiring, on average, 5.7 
hours per kg. and vegetables requiring 5.54 hours per kg.). Nevertheless, this apparent 
equivalency disguises the much higher labor investment required by vegetables.  On average, the 
sample reveals that vegetables required an average of 3,989 labor hours per hectare of cultivation, 
while staple crops required only 782 hours per hectare. Vegetables’ much higher yield per 
hectare explains the rough equivalency of labor input requirements on the hours per kilogram 
basis. Thus, vegetables required over five times more labor input than did staple crops. 
 
Table 9. 
  
Crop Type 
  
Staple Vegetable 
Variable Min. Max. Mean C.V. Min. Max. Mean C.V. 
Labor Hrs. per Kg. 1.5 24.7 5.7 90.6 0.68 29.9 5.54 96.2 
Labor Hrs. per Ha. 128.6 1,736 782.4 63.6 433.8 15,339 3,989 78.5 
 
 Figure 7 illustrates another aspect of the relative labor-intensity of staple and vegetable 
crop production. The figure charts the labor proportion of total production cost of each surveyed 
vegetable and staple crop. For the most labor-intensive vegetable crop, onions, 78% of total 
production cost goes to labor. In contrast, labor’s share of the total cost for lentils (a staple crop) 
was just 54%. Averaging vegetable and staple crops, the labor share of total cost for vegetables 
was 67.3% in the sample, while the labor share of total cost for staple crops was 59.4%. Thus, 
using either method of measurement (total labor-input requirements or relative proportion of 
labor to other costs) vegetables are more labor-intensive than are staple crops. 
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Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fact 3. Vegetables are More Productive than Staple Crops 
 Yield per hectare is the standard measure of farm productivity, but since vegetables and 
staple crops bring significantly different retail values, revenue per hectare is a more informative 
measure. Due to their input-intensive nature, vegetable crops produce significantly larger 
revenues per hectare than do staples, and are thus more productive. As illustrated in Table 10, 
the mean revenue per hectare for vegetable crops in the sample was 513,179 NRs, while mean 
revenue per hectare for staples was 72,318 NRs, or less than one fourth of the vegetable mean.  
Table 10. 
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Crop Type 
Labor Share of Total Cost 
Labor
Share of
Total Cost
  
Crop Type 
  
Staple Vegetable 
Variable Min. Max. Mean S.D. C.V. Min. Max. Mean S.D. C.V. 
Revenue per Hectare 
(NRs/hect.) 
10,474 135,821 72,318 31,087 43 115,588 1,489,977 513,179 372,036 72 
Revenue per Cost (NRs 
earned/100 NRs spent) 
56 233 133 41 3,078 65 651 258 169 6,549 
Revenue per Labor 
Hour (NRs/hr.) 
31 482 123 97 79 31 748 190 170 89 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
70 1,344 309 220 71 72 9,791 4,148 2,130 51 
 
42 
 
 Nevertheless, revenue per hectare is only one measure of farm productivity. Crops that 
are less productive on a revenue per hectare basis may still be more productive on a revenue per 
cost or revenue per labor hour basis. In the case of our dataset, mean revenue per cost for staple 
crops is 133 NRs per 100 NRs invested, while mean revenue per 100 NRs invested for 
vegetables is 258 NRs. Thus, vegetables are still more productive than staple crops when 
compared on a revenue per expenditure basis. When comparing crop types based upon revenue 
per labor hour invested, mean revenue for staples is 123 NRs per hour, and mean revenue for 
vegetables is 190 per hour. Thus, across all measures of productivity, vegetable crops appear to 
be more productivity than do staple crops. 
 Using a Cobb-Douglas Production Function (see Fact 6) we can derive residual the Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) of vegetable and staple crops from the sample. The last row of Table 
10 summarizes the results of this calculation. Mean TFP for vegetable crops is 4,148, three times 
higher than the mean TFP value of 1,344 exhibited by staple crops. This suggests that, 
accounting for all factor inputs, vegetable crops are a more productive use of available resources 
than are staple crops. 
 
Fact 4. Vegetables are, on average, more profitable than staple crops 
 As demonstrated in Fact 2, vegetables require higher labor inputs than do staple crops. 
Therefore, to be worthwhile, vegetables must yield higher returns as well. Due to increasing 
demand from urban centers and export markets in India, vegetables command significantly 
higher retail prices than do staple crops. In the sample, the average price received by farmers for 
vegetable crops was 36.7 NRs per kg., while the average retail price for staple crops was only 
24.6 NRs per kg. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Fact 3, vegetable crops exhibit notably higher 
yields than staple crops. Thus, not only do vegetables garner higher prices on a per kilogram 
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basis, but they also yield more kilograms per land unit and per rupees invested. The resulting 
statistics for gross revenue, expenditure (cost) and gross margin (profit) among surveyed farmers 
in Mid-Western Nepal are reported in Table 11 below. 
Table 11. 
  
Crop Type 
  
Staple Vegetable 
Variable Min. Max. Mean C.V. Min. Max. Mean C.V. 
Gross Revenue (NRs) 10,474 135,821 72,318 43.0 115,588 1,489,978 513,179 72.5 
Expenditure (NRs) 9,203 88,143 55,764 37.6 71,536 594,535 216,626 55.3 
Gross Margin (NRs) -17,603 63,925 16,268 126.7 -88,703 1,261,216 296,553 113.2 
 
 On average, revenue from vegetables is NRs 513,179 per hectare (all values in Table 10 
are in per hectare terms) and NRs 72,318 for staple crops. Thus, revenues are over seven times 
higher for vegetables. However, costs are almost four times higher for vegetables as well. On net, 
vegetable profits were on average eighteen times higher than staple crop profits. Figure 12 
decomposes sample farmers’ costs, revenues, and profits by crop.  
 
Figure 12. 
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 Figure 12 illustrates both the higher returns exhibited by vegetable crops, and the notably 
higher variance of these crops, both in terms of input costs and returns. Traditional staple crops 
such as rice, maize, and lentils, are low-risk, low-return products, as evidenced in the charts 
above. They are subsistence-level crops that mostly guarantee a return but do not yield a profit 
much above zero. These crops are often grown by farmers who are only marginally integrated 
into markets or commodity chains. In contrast, vegetable crops are typically grown as cash crops. 
They offer the potential for much higher returns, but also present the risk of negative profits and 
high variance in outcomes. The implications of this variance are discussed in Fact 5 below.  
 In sum, vegetables are significantly more profitable than staple crops, but require much 
higher inputs and exhibit greater variance in outcomes. 
 
Fact 5. Vegetables are Riskier than Staple Crops 
 As illustrated visually in Figure 12 and numerically in Tables 9, 10, and 11, vegetables 
exhibit greater variance in input requirements and outcomes, relative to staple crops. The 
Coefficient of Variance (CV) of labor hours per hectare for staple crops is 63.6, while the 
equivalent value for vegetables is 78.5. Evidently, the labor requirement for vegetables varies 
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more than that for staples, thus introducing risk and uncertainty into farmers’ production 
decisions. Furthermore, the coefficients of variance for revenue and expenditure per hectare are 
significantly higher for vegetable crops than for staple crops, suggesting that inputs and outputs 
from vegetables are more unpredictable. This unpredictability, as detailed in Section 3.1.2, may 
motivate more risk averse farmers to avoid adopting vegetable crops.  
 Furthermore, producer prices for vegetables exhibit much greater variability than do 
prices for staple crops. As illustrated in Figure 13, annual producer prices for vegetables in 
Nepal are significantly more unstable than staple crop prices (FAOSTAT 2015). While staple 
crop prices have followed a predictable trend since 1997, vegetable prices have fluctuated widely 
over this same time period. If seasonal price data were available for Nepal, the variation in intra-
annual vegetable prices would be even more striking than the variance depicted in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Nepal: Vegetable and Staple Crop Price Trends (1997-2012) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT 2015 
 
 Thus, vegetables not only require more unpredictable levels of labor and cash inputs, but 
also present more unpredictable returns at the point of sale. As a result, we should expect that 
measures of risk such as food security and assets will be strongly associated with vegetable 
adoption. We would predict that improved food security is positively associated with adoption, 
and that increased quantity of assets is positively associated with adoption as well. 
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Fact 6. Vegetables Exhibit Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) whereas Staple 
Crops Exhibit Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) 
 Whether or not vegetable crops enjoy economies of scale could determine the size of 
farm that finds adoption to be optimal. In particular, larger farms will be more inclined to adopt 
vegetables if they exhibit increasing returns to scale, since larger farmers can capitalize upon the 
larger scale of their production facilities and out-compete smaller farmers. On the contrary, if 
vegetables exhibit decreasing returns to scale, then smaller farmers will be more likely to adopt 
since the advantages of adoption would decrease in proportion to the size of the production area. 
In either case, understanding the returns to scale exhibited by vegetable crops is integral to 
disentangling farmers’ adoption behavior. 
 From Figure 14 below, it is apparent that, on the level of correlation, vegetable yields per 
hectare decrease as farm size increases, while staple yields per hectare increase slightly as farm 
size increases. Nevertheless, moving beyond correlation and measuring the effect of a particular 
factor input (in this case, land) on production can be difficult due to the confounding effects of 
other inputs. For instance, farm size may have a negative impact on land productivity, but if 
larger farmers employ productivity-boosting tractors and fertilizers, then these additional scale-
correlated inputs may offset the negative effect of farm size and make the correlation between 
overall productivity and farm size positive. 
Figure 14. Yield per Hectare by Farm Size (blue=vegetables, red=staple crops) 
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To isolate the effects of each factor of production on final output, economists often use a 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function, which allows for increasing, decreasing, and constant 
returns to scale among factors of production. The Cobb-Douglas production function can be 
written in general form as: 
(5.1)           𝑌 = 𝐴(𝑋1
𝛼1𝑋2
𝛼2 … 𝑋𝑛
(1−𝛼1−𝛼2−⋯−𝛼𝑛))𝜀 
Where Y is total output (yield (kg.)), A is total factor productivity (the Cobb-Douglas residual, or 
OLS intercept), X1 is the first factor of production and Xn is the nth factor of production. 𝛼1 is the 
weight that X1 carries, or the share it constitutes, in the production of final good Y. 𝜀 is random 
error term. 
In the case of crop production in Mid-Western Nepal, vegetable and staple crops 
constitute distinct production technologies, and are not comparable to each other. However, we 
can divide the sample into vegetable and staple crop producers, and within each group, describe 
the effects of factor inputs on final production using the two specified production functions 
below: 
(5.2) For Staple crops:    (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡) =   
                  𝐴((𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝛼1(𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝛼2(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝛼3(𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝛼4)𝜀 
(5.3) For Vegetable crops:    (𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 
         𝐴((𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝛼1(𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝛼2(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝛼3(𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝛼4)𝜀 
Where stapleyieldhect and vegetableyieldhect measure total kilograms of output per hectare from 
the respective staple or vegetable crop field, croparea gives the area of that field in hectares, 
laborhrshect measures the number of labor hours invested per hectare, capitalcosthect measures 
the cost of all capital inputs per hectare, and fertilizervolhect measures the kilograms of fertilizer 
applied per hectare. As before, 𝜀 is a random error term. 
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The production function can be log-linearized as follows: 
(5.4)   𝑙𝑛(𝑌) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐴) + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛(𝑋1) + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛(𝑋2) + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛(𝑋3) + 𝛼4 𝑙𝑛(𝑋4) + 𝜀 
Equation 4.4 is now suitable for regression analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
4
 
In order to interpret OLS coefficient estimates, I solve a specified version of the CD 
production function. Both Equations 5.2. and 5.3 above may be written symbolically as: 
(5.5)     
𝑌
𝐿
=
𝐿𝛼𝑁𝛽𝐾𝛾𝐹𝛿
𝐿
 
(5.6)     =
𝐿𝛼𝑁𝛽𝐾𝛾𝐹𝛿
𝐿1−𝛽−𝛾−𝛿𝐿𝛽𝐿𝛾𝐿𝛿
 
 
(5.7)     = 𝐿𝛼+𝛽+𝛾+𝛿−1(
𝑁
𝐿
)𝛽(
𝐾
𝐿
)𝛾(
𝐹
𝐿
)𝛿 
Where L is land area, N is labor, K is capital, and F is fertilizer. From Equation 5.7 it is 
clear that, after log linearization, returns to land are characterized by the sum (𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 −
1). If this sum is greater than zero, then the production function exhibits increasing returns to 
scale. In contrast, if this sum is less than zero, the function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.  
 Results of the OLS regression of the Cobb-Douglas production function for staple and 
vegetable crops are presented in Table 12 below. Coefficient estimates for vegetable and staple 
crops indicate that the sum (𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 − 1) = -0.687 for vegetables and 0.143 for staples. 
Thus, returns to scale for vegetables appear to be decreasing (since -0.687< 0) and returns to 
scale for staples appear to be increasing (since 0.143 > 0). A joint significance test of the 
hypothesis that (𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 − 1) > 0 is significant at the 5% level for vegetables (F=4.89). 
This joint significance test is not significantly different from zero for staples. 
                                                          
4 The estimated OLS coefficients of Equation 5.4 may be biased since factors of production are endogenous to the 
production function. That is, capital, labor, etc. are not randomly selected, but are instead themselves functions of 
output. Nevertheless, while endogeneity means the absolute magnitudes of the OLS coefficients may not be 
interpretable, they are still roughly comparable. 
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Table 12. Regression Results of Cobb-Douglas Production Function for Vegetable and Staple Crops 
      Coefficients 
Explanatory Variables Vegetables 
 
Staples 
Log of crop area 
-0.073 
 
0.179 
  
  
(0.157) 
 
(0.106) 
Log of labor hrs/hectare 
-0.311 
 
0.155 
  
  
(0.242) 
 
(0.172) 
Log of capital input/hectare 
0.686 
 
0.722 
  
  
(0.332) 
 
(0.255) 
Log of fertilizer kilos/hectare 
0.011 
 
0.087 
  
  
(0.067) 
 
(0.057) 
Constant 
3.479 
 
-1.445 
  
  
(2.664) 
 
(2.222) 
R-Squared 
 
0.153 
 
0.500 
  
     Returns to Scale   DRS     IRS 
       Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
 Vegetables likely exhibit DRS because farmers, due to vegetables’ input intensive nature, 
find it difficult to scale up labor and capital inputs in proportion to increases in land. Staples, in 
contrast, likely exhibit IRS because they require much less individualized attention (weeding, 
cross-pollination, etc.) than do vegetables and thus enable economies of scale for larger plantings. 
Consequently, staples deliver disproportionately higher per unit yields for large farmers. 
Further manipulation of Equation 5.1 allows us to calculate the TFP of sampled farmers. 
Comparative TFP values between staple and vegetable crops were reported in Table 10. 
 In sum, vegetable crops exhibit decreasing returns to scale, whereas staple crops exhibit 
increasing returns to scale. This makes intuitive sense, given that vegetables require higher 
individual attention and specialized conditions, whereas staple crops are more uniform and less 
demanding of individualized care. 
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Summary: 
 
Fact 1. Vegetables are a divisible technology 
This suggests that smaller farmers will face less fixed-cost barriers to adoption. Credit should 
therefore not appear to have a significant negative impact on adoption. 
 
Fact 2. Vegetables are more labor-intensive than staple crops 
Due to this fact, larger farms may find it difficult to secure sufficient supplies of labor to grow 
large plots of vegetables. Smaller farmers, however, have a high enough family size to land size 
ratio to grow vegetables. 
 
Fact 3. Vegetables are more productive than staple crops 
Farmers who are able to overcome barriers to the adoption of vegetables will see higher yields 
per hectare relative to staple crop farmers. This creates an incentive for vegetable adoption. 
 
Fact 4. Vegetables are, on average, more profitable than staple crops 
Vegetables are, on average, 18 times more profitable than staples in the sample. This fact 
undergirds our assumption that optimizing farmers would adopt vegetables if they were able to 
overcome extant barriers and constraints.  
 
Fact 5. Vegetables are riskier than staple crops 
While returning higher yields and profits, vegetable crops also exhibit higher variance in input 
costs and returns (including more unpredictable retail prices) than staples. Furthermore, 
vegetable cultivation resulted in negative profits for some farmers in the sample due to poor 
harvests or faulty marketing. This increased variance in costs and returns introduces additional 
uncertainty into vegetable production, perhaps dissuading more risk averse farmers from 
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adopting. Consequently, we should expect to find that variables proxying risk aversion have 
statistically significant effects. The food insecurity dummy should have a negative effect, while 
the assets variable should have a positive effect. Due to risk effects, credit (which allows 
consumption smoothing in the case of a failed harvest) may appear to have a significant positive 
effect, confounding the irrelevance of this variable a measure of the impact of scale.  
 
Fact 6. Vegetables exhibit DRS while staple crops exhibit IRS 
This fact suggests that larger farmers may find vegetables less attractive than do small farmers. 
Large farmers may be able to exploit sufficient quantities of scale on their large plots to increase 
staple crop profits to the point where they are unwilling to substitute these stable (albeit low) 
profits for the uncertainty and increased intensity of vegetables. 
 
 
 The following section reviews a range of limited dependent variable regression models, 
and then develops empirical methods to estimate the effects of farmers’ characteristics on their 
vegetable adoption behavior.  
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6. Model Development and Specification 
The nature of the technology under analysis can determine whether it is appropriate to 
model farmers’ adoption decisions as binary choices or as continuous or graduated choices. For 
instance, the adoption of a tractor would require a binary choice model, such as logit or probit, 
since the farmer’s adoption decision can only assume two forms–adopt or do not adopt. In 
contrast, when analyzing divisible technologies such as vegetables, researchers often wish to 
model not only the either-or adoption decision, but the scale of adoption as well (Feder 1985; 
Sunding and Zilberman 2001).  
In the case of vegetable adoption in my sample, both the binary adoption decision and the 
scale of adoption decision are of interest. First of all, we are interested in the absolute question of 
which characteristics influence farmers to adopt or not adopt vegetables. This question lends 
itself to binary decision model. Furthermore, we are interested in what factors affect the 
magnitude or scale of adoption. As argued in Section 5, farmers in the sample exhibit a wide 
range of adoption commitments, from dedicating just 2.5% of their land to vegetables, to 
dedicating 100% to vegetables. In short, understanding both what prevents many farmers from 
adopting vegetables, and, upon adoption, what influences farmers’ choices of the scale of 
adoption, could improve policy implementation and vegetable cultivation practices in the field. 
 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
The first response to modeling a binary dependent variable model is often the Linear 
Probability Model, or LPM. The LPM simply applies Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to the 
situation in which a vector of explanatory variables predicts the binary (0 or 1) outcome of the 
dependent variable. The model can be described by: 
(6.1)             𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Where Yi equals either 0 or 1, and where 𝜀𝑖 is independent with mean 0 (Wooldridge 2012). 
However, this model suffers from a number of limitations. First, the predicted coefficients are 
unbounded. That is, they can (and often do) assume values outside of the zero to one range. 
Since the model is nominally predicting the probability of Yi, a coefficient outside of the 0 to 1 
range is difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the error term 𝜀𝑖 is heteroskedastic, meaning that 
variance in the error is inconstant and potentially correlated with explanatory variables in Xi 
(Davis, 2015). For these reasons, the LPM is not the most compelling approach to modeling 
limited dependent variables. We thus look to Logit and Probit models for better estimates. 
 
Logit and Probit Models 
 In both the Logit and Probit models, we assume that a continuous but unobserved “latent” 
variable underlies decision makers’ behavior. In the case of farmers in my sample, this latent 
continuous variable can be thought of as an expected utility function, in which farmers’ 
characteristics and characteristics of the technology combine to produce an expected utility from 
vegetable adoption. Nevertheless, the survey could not observe this continuous variable, and 
instead observed a limited-information “indicator” variable, that is, revealed vegetable adoption. 
Farmers’ latent expected utility, Zi, can be described by: 
(6.2)                 𝑍𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term following either the Standard Normal or Standard Logistic 
distribution. The observed variable, Yi, takes binary values 0 or 1, according to: 
(6.3)           𝑌𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖 > 𝑍𝑖
∗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖 ≤ 𝑍𝑖
∗ 
 Where 𝑍𝑖
∗ is the threshold expected utility above which the farmer will optimally choose to 
adopt vegetables (Wooldridge 2012).  
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 We can safely normalize 𝑍𝑖
∗ to 0, indicating that the farmer will adopt vegetables if her 
expected utility from vegetable adoption is positive, and will not adopt if her expected utility is 
negative. Thus, Eq. 6.3 becomes: 
(6.4) 
𝑌𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖 ≤ 0
 
In this case, 
(6.5)      𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1)  = 𝑃(𝑍𝑖 > 0) 
         = 𝑃(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 > 0) 
              = 𝑃(𝜀𝑖 > −(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖)) 
              = 1 − 𝑃(𝜀𝑖 < −(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖)) 
              =1 − 𝐺(−(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖)) 
Where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables and G is a cumulative distribution function of 𝜀𝑖 
that follows either the standard normal or standard logistical distribution (Wooldridge 2012). 
We can assume that G is symmetric about 0. Thus, 
(6.6)        𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 1 − 𝐺(−(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖)) 
                                     = 𝐺(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) = 𝐺(𝑍) 
Where again, G is a cumulative “link” function ranging between o and 1 (Davis 2015). 
In the case of the Logit model,  
(6.7)     𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝐺(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) = 𝜆(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝛼+𝛽𝑋𝑖)
 
Or, alternatively,  
(6.8)          𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = log (
𝑃𝑖
1−𝑃𝑖
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 
In other words, the dependent variable of the Logit Model is the logarithm of the odds that a 
specific choice will be made.  
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In the case of the Probit model, 𝜀𝑖  ~ 𝑁(𝜇, 1) and: 
(6.9)     𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝐺(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) = 𝛷(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) 
Probit models are estimated using non-linear maximum likelihood methods.  
Since Logit and Probit model results are not nested, likelihood ratio tests or Wald tests 
cannot provide comparable measures of goodness of fit (Wooldridge 2012). Studies often report 
pseudo-R
2
 values, which themselves imply additional problems in interpretation. Nevertheless, 
as developed by Hagle and Mitchell (1992), the McKelvey-Zavoina and Aldrich-Nelson pseudo-
R
2  
values exhibit the best results among possible values, and will be reported in the results 
section below. 
 
Interpretation of Logit and Probit Model Results 
 The coefficients derived from Logit and Probit regressions are equivalent to coefficients 
derived from a standard OLS model. They measure the degree of unit-to-unit change between 
explanatory variables and the latent continuous expected utility function. Thus, the signs and 
significance levels of Logit and Probit coefficients are indeed interpretable (Wooldridge 2012). 
Nevertheless, because this latent utility variable is unobserved in the data, the coefficients cannot 
measure the actual magnitude of effect between the explanatory variables and the revealed 
binary dependent variable. In order to interpret the magnitude of the effect of each explanatory 
variable, we need to find the marginal effect of that variable on Yi (Greene 2009).  
 To calculate the individualized marginal effect of a specific continuous X on 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1), 
that is, 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖), we take the partial derivative of P with respect to X: 
(6.10)       
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑋𝑖
= 𝑔(𝑍)𝛽𝑖 
Where g(Z) is the probability distribution function corresponding to G(Z)’s CDF. Using Eq. 6.10, 
we calculate the marginal effect of each Xi in the sample, and then calculate the mean of these 
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marginal effects to arrive at the average partial effect. The resulting average partial effects are 
interpretable, and measure the effect of increasing Xk by one unit ( or 1% if Xk is a logged value) 
on the probability that Yi crosses the threshold from 0 to 1 or vice versa. For those explanatory 
variables that are binary in nature, the marginal effect is calculated as the change in the 
probability of the dependent variable flipping from 0 to 1 given a change from 0 to 1 in the 
explanatory variable (Davis 2015). 
 
Discrete Choice with More than Two Options: Ordered Probit 
 Farmers not only make a binary vegetable adoption decision, but, conditional upon 
choosing to adopt, they also decide how much of their farm to dedicate to vegetable cultivation. 
Using the shareofveg variable that measures the proportion of total available farm area dedicated 
to vegetables, I can estimate an OLS regression to determine the effect of explanatory variables 
on the continuous share of adoption variable. This method is widespread in the technology 
adoption literature (Feder 1985; Zeller et al., 1998). I estimate an OLS model of this nature in the 
results section below. Nevertheless, using OLS to estimate farmers’ share of adoption decision 
imposes a linear relationship on what is, in reality, a graduated and censored decision structure. 
Farmers’ decision making process is graduated because the change in share of adoption from 0 to 
0.001 is modeled linearly with OLS and registers the same effect as the change from 0.001 to 
0.002. Nevertheless, these two gradations are fundamentally different. The decision to adopt 
vegetables in the first place is a much larger decision than that of deciding to marginally 
increasing cultivation area. In other words, the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) does not hold (Davis 2015). Secondly, OLS ignores the censored nature of the 
sample since it fails to disentangle the variance within non-adopting observations.  
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 Alternative models of discrete adoption behavior may therefore be preferable. The two 
available models in this category are the Multinomial Logit model and the Ordered Probit model 
(Greene 2009). Since the IIA assumption has already been thrown out, the Multinomial Logit 
model must be discarded as well. In contrast, the Ordered Probit model does not rely on the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Ordered Probit allows the error term to be correlated 
across alternatives, and accounts for the fundamental differences between different categories in 
the estimated order (Davis 2015). Thus, the Ordered Probit model and its accompanying 
marginal effects are estimated along with OLS in the results section below. 
 
Model Specification 
 The binary adoption decision is modeled in Section 7 with vegadopt as the dependent 
variable. Vegadopt assumes a value of 1 when the observed farmer has adopted vegetable 
cultivation and a 0 when she has not. Logit and Probit models are estimated using the 
explanatory variables given in the equation: 
 (6.11)  (𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡) = 𝛽1(𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) + 𝛽2(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) +  𝛽3ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑡) +
𝛽4(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽5(𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽6(𝑎𝑔𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛽7(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽8(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽9(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝜀 
The explanatory variables included in Eq. 6.11 are drawn from predictions made in Tables 4, 5, 
and 6 of Section 3. Farm area is included to assess the impact of farm size on vegetable adoption. 
From Fact 2 of Section 5, I hypothesize that farm area will be negatively associated with 
vegetable adoption since vegetables require input intensity beyond what large farmers can supply 
under existing market conditions. The family size variable is included to assess the farm’s labor 
supply. I hypothesize that family size will thus have a positive effect on probability of vegetable 
adoption. Distance from Agrovet (agricultural supply store) measures the farmers’ degree of 
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market access. I hypothesize that this variable will be negatively associated with vegetable 
adoption likelihood, since farmers who are farther away from markets will face greater 
challenges in transition to market-dependent production. Education measures the levels of 
schooling reached by farmers. I hypothesize that this variable will be positively associated with 
vegetable adoption, since, in line with scholars of the human capital school, I predict that 
education leads to more effective information gathering and farm-level decision making. I 
hypothesize that the age variable will be positively associated with adoption since older farmers 
possess superior information and experience. However, it could be the case that younger farmers 
adopt earlier due to increased comfort with new technologies and methods. Similarly to my 
reasoning regarding education, I predict that the next variable, agricultural training, will also be 
positively related to rates of vegetable adoption. The agtraining variable also controls for the 
selected sample effects of the non-random selection process. Thus, while this estimate may be 
biased, it serves to reduce bias on other coefficient estimates. Variables measuring farmers’ 
assets and access to credit proxy farmers’ wealth and risk aversion. Farmers with credit and 
significant assets will be more likely to take on the risk of growing vegetables. Thus, I 
hypothesize that both assets and credit will be positively associated with vegetable adoption. 
Finally, higher caste and food insecurity dummies are included to measure the effects of 
belonging to a higher caste group or being food insecure. Much of the political economy 
literature on Nepal highlights the importance of ethnicity, or caste, to the access of resources, 
extension services, and other benefits (Thapa, 2007). I control for the effect of this differential 
resource access by including a dummy registering 1 if the subject identified as Brahmin or 
Chhetri, and 0 if the subject did not. I hypothesize that this variable is positively associated with 
vegetable adoption. The food insecurity dummy registers a value of 1 if the family does not have 
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enough food reserves to last 9 months (is market dependent, in other words) and a 0 if the family 
has sufficient food supplies. This variable is another proxy for risk aversion, since food insecure 
families are much more risk averse than families with surplus food supplies. Thus, I hypothesize 
that the food insecurity dummy will be negatively related to vegetable adoption likelihood. 
 I evaluate the stability of the Logit Model’s findings by systematically adding and 
removing extraneous variables to gauge the effects of different model specifications on core 
variable magnitudes and levels of significance. 
 Furthermore, I measure the scale of vegetable adoption using both standard OLS and an 
Ordered Probit model. Both estimate models similar to that given in Eq. 6.11. My predictions of 
the coefficient signs remain the same as they were for the standard Logit and Probit models.  
 Finally, I verify the reliability of the dataset as a whole by calculating a Logit model for 
farmers’ binary tractor adoption decisions. I predict that a similar range of explanatory variables 
as those used in Eq. 6.11 will again be influential on tractor adoption, except that farm area will 
have a positive effect. This is because of the lumpy nature of tractor technology (See Section 5, 
Fact 1). The possibility exists that the data collection (detailed in Section 4) was flawed and that 
all technologies will exhibit an erroneously negative association with farm area. If, however, 
tractor adoption is positively associated with land area while vegetable adoption is negatively 
associated, the (surprising) negative association between vegetable adoption and farm size is less 
doubtable. 
 In the following section I present regression results from the models developed above. 
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7. Results 
 
Results from the regression models developed in Section 6 are presented in the tables 
below.  For non-logged explanatory variables, marginal effects are interpretable as the change in 
probability (in percentage points) that a farmer adopts vegetables, given a one unit increase in the 
explanatory variable.
5
 For logged explanatory variables, marginal effects give the change in 
probability that a farmer adopts vegetables, given a 1% increase in the explanatory variable. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and levels of significance are indicated with asterisks.  
 As noted in Section 3, recent econometrics scholarship has trended toward the use of 
instrumental variables and randomized controlled trial methods to establish causal links between 
dependent and explanatory variables. Due to limitations on data collection and research design, 
this study relies instead on more traditional regression techniques. Thus, the following results 
indicate correlations between farmer characteristics and vegetable adoption behavior, controlling 
for other relevant variables. Results do not indicate causal effects. 
 
 
7.1 Logit and Probit Regression Results on Binary Vegetable Adoption Decision 
 
 Table 13 presents results from Logit and Probit regressions of the farm-level dataset. I 
analyze the Logit model results in the text. Probit model results are presented for comparison. 
Both models find Farm Area, Distance to Agrovet (agricultural supply store), Age, Agricultural 
Training, Assets, Higher Caste Status, and Food Insecurity to be statistically significant 
explanators of farmers’ vegetable adoption decisions.  
 
                                                          
5
 There is a subtle difference between a “change in percentage” and a “change in percentage points.” Given a 10% 
increase in percentage, a likelihood of 60% would increase to 66%. In contrast, given a 10% increase in percentage 
points, a likelihood of 60% would increase to 70%, that is, would see an increase of 10 percentiles. In the marginal 
effects computed below, all changes are given in terms of percentage points.  
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Table 13. Logit and Probit Regression Results: Effects on Binary Vegetable Adoption Decision 
 
 
Logit Model 
 
Probit Model 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effects 
 
Coefficient Marginal Effects 
Farm Area -0.1862*** -0.0194 
 
-0.1041*** -0.0198 
  
(0.0549) 
  
(0.0278) 
 
Family Size -0.1156 -0.0120 
 
-0.0673 -0.0128 
  
(0.1265) 
  
(0.0716) 
 
Dist. to Agrovet -0.6668** -0.0800 
 
-0.3257** -0.0749 
  
(0.3287) 
  
(0.1728) 
 
Education 0.1549 0.0161 
 
0.1333 0.0253 
  
(0.2570) 
  
(0.1399) 
 
Age 
 
0.1168** 0.0122 
 
0.0626** 0.0119 
  
(0.0491) 
  
(0.0252) 
 
Ag. Training 0.3759* 0.0392 
 
0.2363* 0.0450 
  
(0.2239) 
  
(0.1258) 
 
Assets 0.5162** 0.0538 
 
0.2454** 0.0467 
  
(0.2304) 
  
(0.1159) 
 
Credit -1.0200 -0.1013 
 
-0.6291 -0.1013 
  
(0.9859) 
  
(0.5368) 
 
Higher Caste -1.8366** -0.2203 
 
-0.8874* -0.2203 
  
(0.9076) 
  
(0.4802) 
 
Food Insecure -2.5808*** -0.2176 
 
-1.4033** -0.2176 
  
(1.2267) 
  
(0.6551) 
 
Constant -4.0293 
  
-2.1660 
 
  
(2.3064) 
  
(1.2452) 
 
Goodness of Fit: 
     McKelvey-Zavoina 0.8681 
  
0.8402 
 
Aldrich-Nelson 0.3836 
  
0.4125 
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
* = significant at 10% level 
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Farm area is negatively associated with vegetable adoption at the 1% level of significance, 
and the marginal effect of -0.0194 indicates that a 1 ropani increase in farm area is associated 
with a 1.9% decrease in the probability of vegetable adoption, holding other variables constant. 
This surprising result contradicts standard theories of technology adoption, which predict that 
larger farmers will adopt new technologies first, and suggests instead that smaller farmers in the 
sample are significantly more likely to adopt vegetables than are larger farmers. 
 Distance to Agrovet is negatively associated with vegetable adoption at the 5% level of 
significance. Its marginal effect is -0.08, indicating that a 1% increase in the distance from farm 
to an agricultural supply store (which proxies distance to road and market is well) coincides with 
an 8% decrease in the likelihood of adopting vegetables. This result suggests that transportation 
costs and the increased risk and uncertainty that come with distance from agricultural supplies 
and markets is a significant barrier to vegetable adoption.  
 Farmers’ Age is found to be positively associated with vegetable adoption at the 5% level 
of significance. Its marginal effect is 0.0122, indicating that a one year increase in age coincides 
with a 1.2% increase in the probability of vegetable adoption. Thus, a farmer who is ten years 
older than another appears 12% more likely to adopt vegetables, holding other variables constant. 
 Agricultural Training sessions (which measures the number of KISAN program training 
sessions attended) is found to be positively associated with vegetable adoption at the 10% level 
of significance. The marginal effect of 0.0392 indicates that, for each additional training session 
attended, farmers appear 3.9% more likely to adopt vegetables. This suggests that agricultural 
trainings and extension services have a positive impact on vegetable adoption in the sample.  
Farmers’ Assets are found to be positively associated with vegetable adoption at the 5%  
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level of significance. The large marginal effect of 0.0538 indicates that an additional “asset” held 
by the farmer is associated with a 5.4% increase in her probability of adopting vegetables.
6
  
 Farmers’ membership in a higher caste group is a significant predictor of vegetable 
adoption at the 5% level of significance. The marginal effect of -0.2203 suggests that changing 
from a low to high caste group is associated with a 22% decrease in the likelihood of vegetable 
adoption. This result is surprising, and will be discussed further in the discussion section below.  
 Finally, Food Insecurity is negatively associated with vegetable adoption at the 1% level 
of significance. The marginal effect is -0.2176, indicating that a food-insecure farmer appears 
21.8% less likely to adopt vegetables than a food-secure farmer. Evidently, food insecurity (as a 
measure of risk aversion) is a significant barrier to vegetable adoption. 
 
7.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Logit Regression Results 
 
 The variables included in the Logit and Probit regressions above were selected based on 
their relevance to economic theories and predictions drawn from the agricultural technology 
adoption literature. Thus, even though variables such as education, credit, and family size are 
found to be insignificant in the regressions, they are retained in the model because the underlying 
theory of technology adoption suggests we should control for them nonetheless. 
The dataset includes a number of additional variables that could feasibly affect farmers’ 
vegetable adoption decisions but are either marginal to the predictions derived from economic 
theory or are largely collinear with already-included variables. These include farmers’ gender, 
and the retail price differential between vegetable and staple crops in individual villages. These 
variables are rarely discussed in the literature. 
                                                          
6
 Measured “assets” included cellphone, radio, TV, electricity, motorcycle, bicycle, cart, tractor, livestock, poultry, 
agro. Machinery, gas stove, and biogas. Each recorded asset was given a value of one, and the sum of total assets 
was treated as a rough measure of each farmer’s material wealth (not including land) 
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 Furthermore, the dataset includes measures of each farmer’s distance from nearest market 
and distance from nearest main road. These two measures are largely collinear with Distance 
from Agrovet. Finally, the dataset includes information on each farmer’s ownership of a tractor 
or a motor pump, which are closely collinear with measures of Assets.  
 Table 14 below presents a “sensitivity analysis” of the Logit Model of vegetable 
adoption.
7
 Each column represents a unique regression, beginning with a model that includes all 
core and additional variables discussed above. Gender, Price Differential, Distance to Market, 
Distance to Road, and Pump are found to be insignificant. Tractor is found to be weakly 
significant. Each regression to the right of this baseline regression drops insignificant variables 
until only core variables remain. The insignificance of distance to road and market, pump, and 
tractor is a likely result of the collinearity of these variables with Distance to Agrovet and Assets, 
respectively. Choosing core regression variables through this method (known as data fishing or 
data mining) is frowned upon for violating the random selection assumption underlying all 
regression models. However, by maintaining my selection of theoretically derived core variable 
regardless of their significance and winnowing out insignificant additional variables, I am able to 
evaluate the stability of my core variable regression results. If adding or removing additional 
variables radically changed the level of significance or sign of my core variables, this would 
suggest that my core regression results were more the product of luck than of real trends in the 
data. In contrast, as illustrated in Table 14, core variable signs and levels of significance are 
remarkably stable over a range of alternative specifications.  
 
                                                          
7
 The Logit model used in Table 14 is described by (𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡) = 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) +
 𝛽3ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑔𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽8(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽9(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽𝑛(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝜀. Thus, the coefficients are slightly 
different than those reported in Table 13, but the stability of results holds for Table 13 nonetheless. 
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Table 14. Sensitivity Analysis of Logit Regression 
Variables ________________________Coefficients___________________________ 
Constant 
 
-2.9049 -1.7569 -3.3904 -4.7008 -5.7193 -4.0484 
  
(7.0356) (6.2111) (5.8732) (5.5006) (5.3250) (4.8178) 
Farm Area -2.3313*** -2.2478*** -1.9525** -1.9244** -2.0422*** -2.6218*** 
  
(0.9014) (0.8449) (0.7727) (0.7549) (0.7528) (0.7374) 
Family Size -1.4305 -1.4215 -1.2827 -1.4727 -1.2832 -0.8583 
  
(1.1668) (1.1519) (1.1010) (1.0566) (1.0072) (0.9414) 
Dist. to Agrovet -1.0642* -0.9844** -0.7904** -0.8466** -0.8129** -0.6054* 
  
(0.5725) (0.4927) (0.3783) (0.3697) (0.3610) (0.3282) 
Education 1.0556 0.8860 0.6572 0.5879 0.6422 0.6298 
  
(1.0184) (0.8730) (0.7737) (0.7595) (0.7546) (0.7213) 
Ag. Training 0.4958 0.5552 0.7567 0.8605 0.9746 0.4567 
  
(0.7750) (0.7673) (0.7678) (0.7559) (0.7428) (0.6473) 
Assets 2.5990* 2.5047* 2.6346* 2.8310** 3.0571** 3.1074** 
  
(1.3654) (1.3303) (1.3447) (1.3320) (1.3303) (1.2720) 
Credit -1.1809 -1.1574 -0.6568 -0.7357 -0.7225 -0.8401 
  
(1.1215) (1.1108) (0.9698) (0.9718) (0.9571) (0.9499) 
Higher Caste -1.5882 -1.5231 -1.5538 -1.7124* -2.0110** -2.1549** 
  
(1.0511) (1.0404) (0.9974) (0.9732) (0.9321) (0.9358) 
Food Insecure -3.7151** -3.6557** -3.4860*** -3.2788*** -3.2602*** -3.4669*** 
  
(1.5493) (1.5030) (1.3109) (1.2626) (1.2506) (1.2402) 
Age 
 
3.4290 2.9634* 2.9560** 2.9544** 3.1051** 2.6332** 
  
(2.0967) (1.5412) (1.4731) (1.4352) (1.4057) (1.2942) 
Tractor 
 
-2.9948* -2.8509* -2.1660 -2.1260* -2.1051 
 
  
(1.5592) (1.4770) (1.2978) (1.2125) (1.2118) 
 
Pump 
 
1.2282 1.1902 1.0446 0.8246 
  
  
(1.1168) (1.1122) (1.0516) (0.9855) 
  Price 
Differential -0.8448 -0.7940 -0.6469 
   
  
(0.7261) (0.7005) (0.6683) 
   
Dist. to Road -0.3203 -0.3012 
    
  
(0.3532) (0.3490) 
    
Dist. to Market 0.6997 0.6546 
    
  
(0.6372) (0.6108) 
    
Gender 
 
-0.4242 
     
  
(1.2629) 
     Goodness of Fit: 
      McKelvey-
Zavoina 0.9162 0.9123 0.8981 0.8977 0.8961 0.8727 
Aldrich-Nelson 0.4224 0.4218 0.4135 0.4090 0.4058 0.3894 
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level 
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Farm area, Family Size, Distance to Agrovet, Education, Agricultural Training, Assets, 
Credit, Higher Caste, Food Insecure, and Age all exhibit similar levels of significance and 
uniformity in sign and magnitude of parameter estimates across all regressions. This suggests 
that the model specification computed in Tables 13 and 16 is indeed stable and descriptive. 
 
7.3 OLS Regression Results on Intensity of Vegetable Adoption 
 
 
 Beyond the binary decision of whether or not to adopt vegetables, farmers also face the 
more complex decision of how much of their farm area to devote to vegetable production.  
Section 6 discussed a variety of approaches to modeling the intensity of vegetable adoption. This 
section employs an OLS model to estimate farmers’ share of vegetable adoption (a measure 
running from 0 to 1 that reports the proportion of a farmers’ field area dedicated to vegetable 
cultivation). The following section uses an Ordered Probit model.  
 Table 15 reports results from the OLS estimation of farmers’ Share of Vegetables. Farm 
Area, Family Size, Age, Assets, and Higher Caste status are found to be significant explanators 
of the proportion of farm area farmers choose to dedicate to vegetables. Farm area is negatively 
associated with Share of Vegetables at the 1% level of significance. The elasticity of this effect is 
-0.0044, suggesting that a 1 ropani increase in farm area is related to a decrease of 0.004 in the 
proportion (out of 1) of a farmer’s field dedicated to vegetables. Thus, a 10 ropani increase in 
farm size would coincide with a farmer dedicating 4% less farm area to vegetables, when 
controlling for all other variables.  
 Family Size is significant at the 10% level and its elasticity of -0.0122 suggests that a 1 
person increase in family size is associated with a 0.012 reduction in the share of farm area 
dedicated to vegetables.  
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Table 15. OLS Regression Results: Intensity of Vegetable Adoption  
(Dependent Variable = shareofveg, measuring proportion of farm area dedicated to vegetables) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients 
Farm Area -0.0044*** 
  
(0.0018) 
Family Size -0.0122* 
  
(0.0057) 
Dist. To Agrovet -0.0001 
  
(0.0002) 
Education -0.0003 
  
(0.0108) 
Age 
 
0.0017* 
  
(0.0015) 
Ag. Training 0.0035 
  
(0.0079) 
Assets 0.0177*** 
  
(0.0088) 
Credit 0.0225 
  
(0.0385) 
Higher Caste -0.1044*** 
  
(0.0652) 
Food Insecure -0.0257 
  
(0.0460) 
Constant 0.0363 
  
(0.0858) 
Goodness of Fit: 
 R-Squared 0.2762 
Adj. R-Squared 0.1682 
F(10,77) 
 
2.5600 
      Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
                  *** = significant at 1% level 
      ** = significant at 5% level 
      * = significant at 10% level 
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Age is positively associated with Share of Vegetable at the 10% significance level, with a 
coefficient of 0.0017, suggesting that a 1 year increase in age coincides with a 0.0017 increase in 
share of farm area dedicated to vegetables. Assets are positively associated with vegetable share 
at the 1% significance level, and with a coefficient estimate of 0.018, a 1 asset increase is related 
to a 0.018 increase in share of farm area dedicated to vegetables. Finally, Higher Caste is 
negatively associated with Share of Vegetables at the 1% level of significance. A shift from 
lower to higher caste group coincides with an approximately 0.1 decrease in share of vegetables. 
Thus, the results of the OLS regression on Share of Vegetables roughly mirror the results 
found in the Logit and Probit models reported in Table 13. Farm Area, notably, is again found to 
be negatively associated with vegetable adoption. 
 
7.4 Ordered Probit Regression Results on Intensity of Vegetable Adoption 
 
 
 The OLS model in Section 7.3 offers a rough estimation of the explanators of farmers’ 
vegetable adoption intensity decisions, but fails to capture the necessarily stepwise pattern in 
adoption intensity. That is, the shift from no adoption (share = 0) to adoption (share = 0.001) is 
significantly different than the shift from share = 0.001 to share = 0.002. As detailed in Section 6, 
an Ordered Probit regression model can capture this stepwise pattern, and in effect estimate a 
series of nested binary decisions. Table 16 presents the results of the Ordered Probit regression 
on the dataset. The dependent variable employed in the model is a constructed dummy variable 
that assumes the value of 0 when the farmer has not adopted vegetables, 1 when the farmer has 
adopted vegetables but dedicates less than 8% of farm area to them, 2 when the farmer dedicates 
8-15% of farm area to vegetables, and 3 when the farmer dedicates more than 15% of farm area 
to vegetables. For each explanatory variable, marginal effects are calculated to measure the 
marginal change in probability between each category and the next.  
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Table 16. Ordered Probit Regression Results: Effects on Intensity of Vegetable Adoption 
 
 
 
 
________________Change in Predicted Probabilities (Marginal Effects)_______________ 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Ordered Probit 
Estimates 
Do Not Adopt 
Vegetables 
Dedicate 0-8% of 
Land to Vegetables 
Dedicate 8-15% of 
Land to Vegetables 
Dedicate >15% of 
Land to Vegetables 
Farm Area 
 
-0.0824*** 0.0195 -0.0233 -0.0732 -0.2563 
  
(0.0220) 
    
Family Size -0.0993 0.0235 0.0007 -0.0048 -0.0195 
  
(0.0546) 
    
Dist. to Agrovet -0.1853 0.0453 -0.0030 -0.0094 -0.0329 
  
(0.1228) 
    
Age 0.0874* -0.0304 0.0020 0.0063 0.0221 
  
(0.0992) 
    
Education 0.0262 -0.0059 0.0004 0.0012 0.0043 
  
(0.0153) 
    
Ag. Training 0.0794 -0.0188 -0.0006 0.0038 0.0156 
  
(0.0780) 
    
Assets 0.2814*** -0.0666 -0.0020 0.0135 0.0551 
  
(0.0912) 
    
Credit -0.1520 0.0627 -0.0041 -0.0130 -0.0455 
  
(0.3545) 
    
Higher Caste -0.9985*** 0.1443 -0.0161 -0.0507 -0.0775 
  
(0.3840) 
    
Food Insecure -0.3107*** 0.0736 -0.0185 -0.0582 -0.2035 
  
(0.4275) 
    
Constant -1.1108 
    
  
(0.8764) 
    
Goodness of Fit: 
     N =  78 36 13 13 16 
Log Likelihood -74.5889 
    
McKelvey-Zavoina 0.8079 
    
Aldrich-Nelson 0.4013 
     
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
* = significant at 10% level 
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Table 16 indicates that Farm Area, Age, Assets, Higher Caste status, and Food Insecurity are 
statistically significant explanators of the intensity of farmers’ vegetable adoption.  
 Farm Area is again negatively associated with vegetable adoption at the 1% level of 
significance. A one ropani increase in farm area coincides with farmers being 1.9% more likely 
to not adopt any vegetables, 2.3% less likely to dedicate 0-8% of their fields to vegetables, 7.3% 
less likely to dedicate 8-15% of their fields to vegetables, and 25.6% less likely to dedicate more 
than 15% of their fields to vegetables. Evidently, larger farmers not only adopt vegetables less 
often, but they dedicate smaller portions of their fields to vegetables even when they do adopt. 
 Age is positively associated with vegetable adoption at the 10% level of significance. A 
one year increase in farmers’ age coincides with that farmer being 3% less likely to not adopt 
vegetables, 0.2% more likely to dedicate 0-8% of her fields to vegetables, 0.6% more likely to 
dedicate 8-15% of her fields to vegetables, and 2.2% more likely to dedicate more than 15% of 
her fields to vegetables. Older farmers appear to adopt vegetables to a greater extent and in 
higher shares than do younger farmers. 
 Assets are positively associated with vegetable adoption at the 1% level of significance. 
A one asset increase is related to a farmer being 6.6% less likely to not adopt vegetables, 0.2% 
more likely to dedicate 0-8% of her fields to vegetables, 1.4% more likely to dedicate 8-15% of 
her fields to vegetables, and 5.5% more likely to dedicate more than 15% of her fields to 
vegetables. This suggests that farmers with more material wealth (and capital) are more likely to 
adopt vegetables and dedicate larger share of their fields to them (likely because they have the 
capital inputs necessary to cultivate more of these labor-intensive crops).  
 Higher caste status is negatively associated with vegetable adoption at the 1% level of 
significance. A shift from low to high caste status is related to a farmer being 14.4% less likely to 
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not adopt vegetables, 1.6% less likely to dedicate 0-8% of her fields to vegetables, 5.1% less 
likely to dedicate 8-15% of her fields to vegetables, and 7.8% less likely to dedicate more than 
15% of her fields to vegetables. Members of less privileged ethnic groups tend to adopt 
vegetables to a greater extent than do members of more privileged ethnic groups. 
 Finally, Food Insecurity is negatively associated with vegetable adoption at the 1% level 
of significance. A shift from food security to food insecurity (not having sufficient food stores to 
last at least 9 months) is related to a farmer being 7.4% less likely to not adopt vegetables, 1.8% 
less likely to dedicate 0-8% of her fields to vegetables, 5.8% less likely to dedicate 8-15% of her 
fields to vegetables, and, strikingly, 20.3% less likely to dedicate more than 15% of her fields to 
vegetables. Farmers who are food insecure are more risk averse, and will not over-expose 
themselves to market uncertainties by dedicating too large a share to vegetables, for reasons 
described in Section 3.1.2. 
 
7.5 Logit Regression Results on Tractor Adoption 
 
 The surprising finding that farm area is consistently negatively associated with vegetable 
adoption (as seen in Logit, Probit, OLS, and Ordered Probit models) contradicts the orthodox 
predictions of the technology adoption literature. The majority of this literature predicts that 
larger farmers will adopt new technologies first because they tend to be more educated, have 
more capital, have better access to credit and market information, and enjoy economies of scale. 
However, as demonstrated in Section 5, which presented facts about high value vegetables, the 
nature of the technology being adopted can greatly influence the degree to which these scale-
biased factors play a role.  
 To test whether the nature of the technology being modeled can shape the effects of 
explanatory variables, I next compute a Logit model regression of tractor adoption in the dataset.  
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Tractors are a lumpy technology and exhibit increasing returns to scale. Thus, they fit the 
standard assumptions underlying technology adoption predictions. Tractors should be adopted 
most readily by large farmers who have access to credit and who suffer from labor shortages. If 
the Logit regression of tractor adoption again shows a negative relation between farm size and 
adoption, we may suspect that the data itself may be flawed and biased towards atypically 
adoption-prone small farmers. If, on the other hand, we find a positive relation between 
probability of tractor adoption and farm area, we should be more confident in the surprising 
negative relationship observed between probability of vegetable adoption and farm area. Table 
17 presents the Logit Model regression results for the probability of tractor adoption among 
farmers in the dataset.  
 
Table 17. Logit Regression Results: Effects on Tractor Adoption Decision 
 
 
Logit Model 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effects 
Farm Area 0.2004*** 0.0211 
  
(0.0567) 
 
Family Size -0.4318** -0.0454 
  
(0.2087) 
 
Dist. to Agrovet -0.0116 -0.0012 
  
(0.0095) 
 
Education -0.1515 -0.0159 
  
(0.2571) 
 
Age 
 
-0.0470 -0.0049 
  
(0.0396) 
 
Ag. Training 0.4677** 0.0492 
  
(0.2019) 
 
Assets 
 
-0.2921 -0.0307 
  
(0.2230) 
 
Credit 0.4257 0.0448 
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(0.9813) 
 
Higher Caste -0.3896 -0.0410 
  
(1.4077) 
 
Food Insecure 2.1205 0.2231 
  
(1.3957) 
 
Constant 0.5777 
 
  
(2.0762) 
 Goodness of Fit: 
  McKelvey-Zavoina 0.8150 
 Aldrich-Nelson 0.2707 
       Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
       *** = significant at 1% level 
         ** = significant at 5% level 
                              * = significant at 10% level 
  
Results in Table 17 indicate that indeed, the standard technology adoption predictions do hold 
true when the technology analyzed is the tractor. Farm area is positively associated with 
probability of tractor adoption at the 1% level of significance, and the marginal effect of 0.0211 
indicates that a one ropani increase in farm area is related to a 2.1% increase in the probability of 
tractor adoption. A twenty ropani increase in farm area thus coincides with a 42% increase in the 
likelihood of tractor adoption. 
 This divergence in results (a positive relation between farm size and adoption for tractors, 
a negative relation between farm size and adoption for vegetables) supports this study’s thesis 
that the characteristics of the technology being analyzed are essential to our understanding of 
what constraints limit adoption and what types of farmers are favored. 
 The following section (Section 8) offers analysis and discussion of the results revealed 
through the models developed above. 
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8. Discussion of Results 
 The results reported in Section 7 largely coincide across alternative regression models. It 
is evident that, broadly speaking, farm area is negatively related to the probability of vegetable 
adoption, and particularly negatively related to the likelihood of dedicating larger proportions of 
farm area to vegetables. Distance to an agricultural supply store likewise is negatively related to 
likelihood of vegetable adoption. Age, Agricultural Training, and Assets have broadly positive 
associations with the likelihood of adoption, with Assets having a considerably large positive 
association with the probability of adopting larger proportions of vegetables as well. Higher 
Caste status and Food Insecurity have strongly negative relations to both adoption likelihood and 
the likelihood of dedicating larger shares of one’s farm to vegetables. Family size has a mostly 
statistically insignificant effect in the dataset, as do education and credit. Nevertheless, 
theoretical models of technology adoption suggest that we must still control for these variables.  
 These regression results, taken alongside the empirical facts about vegetables that were 
developed in Section 5, allow us to answer the fundamental question that has driven this study: 
Given that vegetables yield significantly higher returns than do staple crops, why are so many 
farmers in Mid-Western Nepal not adopting them? If farmers are indeed rational agents, as I 
argue they are in Section 3, then they will not be restrained by tradition or custom and will adopt 
more profitable agricultural practices if external scale, capital, and risk constraints do not impede 
them. What constraints, then, could be distorting Nepali farmers’ household economies in such a 
way as to make the choice of low-value staples over high-value vegetables an optimal one? 
 
The Impact of Farm Size on Vegetable Adoption 
 One of the principle factors constraining vegetable adoption is their labor-intensity. 
Vegetables require approximately five times more labor per hectare than do staple crops. For 
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small farms with large families, the high labor requirement of vegetables is actually an advantage: 
since small farms are comparatively land poor and labor rich, they find it optimal to produce 
labor-intensive crops to maximize the returns from their limited land.
8
 In contrast, large farms 
are comparatively land rich and labor poor, and find it difficult to exert enough family labor or 
hire enough contract labor to produce labor-intensive vegetables. Figure 15 illustrates the 
declining ratio between number of family members and land area among farmers in the dataset. 
 
Figure 15. Family to Land Ratio on Farms in Mid-Western Nepal 
 
As farms increase in size, they have proportionately less family members per land unit 
than do smaller farms. They therefore have less family labor available to produce crops. Since 
vegetables are more labor-intensive than staples, large farms face a severe labor constraint on 
vegetable adoption and production. It is for this reason that regression results in Section 7 show 
a significant negative relation between farm size and likelihood of vegetable adoption. 
 Given the significantly greater profits to be made from vegetables, however, large farms 
should still optimally grow vegetables and hire labor to produce them. Nevertheless, very few  
                                                          
8
 Given this analysis, Family Size should theoretically be positively associated with vegetable adoption. The 
regression models nevertheless found Family Size to be either insignificant or weakly negatively related to adoption. 
This is likely because the measure for family size did not break number of family members down into working 
members and non-working members. The fact that some families could have many young children or elderly 
members, while others could be predominantly of working age, adds significant noise to the data, making the 
variable mostly insignificant. Furthermore, Family Size could show a negative correlation because larger families 
have more members depending on them and thus be more risk averse, avoiding vegetables due to uncertainty and 
increased inertia. 
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farmers (6 out of 78) had actually hired labor in the sample. This dearth of hired labor, in the 
face of such significant gains to be had from hiring labor, suggests a severe labor market failure 
in Mid-Western Nepal. Larger farmers would presumably hire labor to produce vegetables if 
they could, and their failure to do so suggests that, at least during the season of the survey, this 
labor was not available.  
 Before going further, we should perhaps ask whether the surprising negative relationship 
between farm size and productivity is due not to relative land/labor ratios and labor market 
failure, but rather to an atypical data sample in which large farmers do not happen to fit the 
standard assumptions. Most agricultural economists predict that larger farmers are more educated 
and enjoy greater food security than do smaller farmers. These factors make them more aware of 
new technologies and less risk averse than smaller farmers would be. Figure 16 illustrates 
average levels of education and food security, as measured by farm size. Both education and 
food security increase as farm size increases, suggesting that farmers in the dataset do in fact fit 
the standard assumptions of the technology adoption literature. 
 
Figure 16. Levels of Education and Food Security by Farm Size 
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 Thus, it appears that smaller farmers’ propensity to adopt vegetables relative to large 
farmers is indeed an optimal response to land scarcity and labor abundance, whereas large 
farmers’ failure to adopt suggests a failure of regional labor markets to supply seasonal labor. 
 
The Role of Risk and Uncertainty in Farmers’ Vegetable Adoption Decisions 
 As established in Section 5, vegetables are not only much more profitable than are staple 
crops, they are also much riskier. That is, they are high-risk, high-reward crops. And as 
explained in Section 3.1.2, farmers in a developing country context such as Nepal are often 
averse to risk and uncertainty for highly rational reasons. Being labor-intensive, vegetables 
require larger up-front investment, yet with more volatile market prices, they promise less 
predictable rewards. Vegetables’ short time-to-spoilage limits farmers’ ability to wait until the 
price is right. And perhaps most decisively, new vegetable technologies are simply an unknown 
variable for farmers: they have unknown consequences and require new, untested techniques.  
For all of these reasons, each of the variables in my regression models that measures 
factors related to risk and uncertainty has a negative association with the probability of vegetable 
adoption. Distance to Agrovet measures both the difficulty of bringing fast-spoiling goods to 
market (since Agrovets are often in the same location as the local market) and the difficulty in 
acquiring new information regarding prices and techniques (since contact with merchants, 
extension agents, and other farmers occurs most often in the market). Furthermore, Distance to 
Agrovet measures the difficulty of repairing damaged equipment and obtaining new seeds and 
fertilizers–vital inputs for input-intensive vegetable cultivation. Unsurprisingly, a 1% increase in 
Distance from Agrovet coincides with an 8% decrease in the likelihood of adopting vegetables in 
the Logit model. This is the largest association found for a continuous variable in the model.   
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 Agricultural Training is another variable that proxies farmers’ access to information and 
new techniques. Insofar as agricultural trainings reduce farmers’ uncertainty regarding vegetable 
cultivation techniques and production outcomes, they should reduce farmers’ uncertainty and 
have a positive effect on the likelihood of adoption. The Logit model results corroborate this 
prediction by indicating that for each additional agricultural training session farmers attended, 
they were 3.9% more likely to adopt vegetables. Thus, trainings appear effective in reducing 
farmers’ uncertainty regarding vegetable cultivation. 
 A large source of uncertainty among farmers comes from inexperience. Young farmers 
simply haven’t lived long enough to acquire the experience necessary to understand prospective 
advantages and disadvantages of new technologies. Thus, age (as a proxy for experience) 
reduces farmers’ uncertainty and increases their likelihood to adopt. We see in the data that each 
additional year of age is associated with a 1.2% increase in the likelihood of vegetable adoption. 
A 60 year old farmer is therefore 48% more likely to adopt vegetables than is a 20 year old. 
 A farmer with more assets has more property to use as collateral for loans, increasing her 
ability to smooth consumption in the event of a crop failure and thus reducing risk aversion. 
Assets also represent a store of wealth that can be drawn upon in times of scarcity, thus serving 
as a sort of insurance in areas where formal insurance schemes are not active. We should 
therefore expect farmers’ level of assets to be positively associated with vegetable adoption. 
Results from the Logit model suggest that, indeed, each additional asset controlled by a farmer is 
related to a 5.4% increase in her probability of vegetable adoption. In this sense, wealthier 
farmers (not including land-wealth) adopt more often than do farmers with fewer assets. 
Finally, the regression variable Food Insecure measures whether or not a farm household 
has a sufficient store of food to last at least nine months. Farmers without sufficient food 
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supplies exist on a knife-edge of subsistence and cannot afford to adopt risky new products or 
overexpose themselves to unpredictable markets. As a result, the Logit model regression 
indicates that a food-insecure farmer is 21.8% less likely to adopt vegetables than is a food-
secure farmer. This large association suggests that food insecurity (as a source of risk aversion) 
is one of the principle barriers to vegetable adoption in Mid-Western Nepal.  
Farmers in the risk-averse situations described above find themselves in a “Catch-22” 
known as a poverty trap. They rationally avoid adopting more profitable crops and technologies 
because the uncertainty and risk involved in the decision to adopt outweigh the longer-term 
benefits of adoption. Poverty traps are especially potent where insurance and credit markets are 
not properly functioning, as is the case for some farmers in Mid-Western Nepal.  
An alternative means of examining the negative effects of risk and uncertainty on 
vegetable adoption is to simulate farmers’ production outcomes over “good” and “bad” years. If 
farmers regularly face bad years in which low retail prices and high costs make vegetable 
production unprofitable, they may rationally opt for lower-return staple crops to avoid such 
volatility. Drawing on producer price data from FAOSTAT, Figure 17 simulates a “bad” year 
for farmers in the dataset in which all producer prices assume the average value of the lowest 
quartile in the 1997-2012 producer price distribution, and where costs of labor are unadjusted by 
the wage-adjustment equation detailed in Appendix A (resulting in an approximately 20% 
increase in the cost of labor). Figure 18 simulates a “good” year for farmers in which all 
producer prices assume the average value of the highest quartile in the 1997-2012 producer price 
distribution, and where costs of labor remain adjusted.  
Comparing Figures 17 and 18, we see that staple crops are hardly affected by changes in 
crop prices and wages, since they require less labor investment and exhibit less price volatility. 
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Figure 18. Simulated Crop Returns in Good Season (low labor costs, high prices) 
 
 
Thus, staple crops represent a certain level of security against price swings. This is likely the 
reason for which even those farmers who adopt vegetables choose to devote only small portions 
of farm area to their cultivation. In contrast to staple crops, vegetables exhibit vastly different 
returns between good and bad years. In good years, 90% of vegetable farmers earn a positive 
profit, and approximately 80% earn more than they would have with staples. Nevertheless, in a 
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bad year (occurring approximately once every four years) a full 25% of farmers earn negative 
profits, and only 50% make more than they would have with staple crops.  
In an economy with functioning insurance markets these occasional losses could be 
smoothed over and the good years would more than compensate for the difficult ones. Without 
insurance, however, a single season of negative profits on a cash crop could mean starvation or 
severe deprivation for a farm household. In the face of this level of risk, many farmers may opt 
to avoid vegetables altogether. The results of the Logit and Ordered Probit regressions in Section 
7 suggest that, in practice, farmers who are susceptible to risk and food insecurity often avoid 
vegetable adoption altogether, while more secure farmers continue to dedicate only small 
portions of their farms to vegetables while maintaining a large share of staple crops as well. 
 
Understanding the Importance of Technology-Specific Characteristics 
 Nearly all studies of agricultural technology adoption focus almost entirely on the effects 
of farmers’ characteristics (such as education, farm size, age, wealth, etc.) on adoption. Studies 
often try to deepen their analyses by measuring more difficult-to-observe characteristics such as 
farmers’ expectations, perceptions of risk, and learning processes. Nevertheless, many of these 
studies provide only glancing and perfunctory analyses of the technologies being adopted. As 
demonstrated in Section 7 above however, the same model and dataset may yield drastically 
different results depending on which technology is being analyzed. Farm size was found to have 
a significantly negative effect upon the likelihood of vegetable adoption, whereas farm size had a 
significantly positive effect upon the likelihood of tractor adoption. The roots of this difference 
lie, not in the explanatory variables–which are identical–but in the nature of the technology itself. 
Vegetables are divisible and labor-intensive, whereas tractors are lumpy and labor-saving. Thus, 
in the final analysis I find that labor constraints play a much larger role than do capital 
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constraints in limiting vegetable adoption in Mid-Western Nepal. More broadly, I find that 
technology-specific characteristics are an essential component in understanding farmers’ 
adoption behavior. Future studies should place a stronger focus on analyzing this aspect.  
 
The Equity Impacts of High-Value Vegetables in Mid-Western Nepal 
 Development projects and government initiatives that attempt to introduce new farming 
practices or alter the ways in which farms operate on a micro-level (such as USAID’s effort to 
introduce high-value vegetables in Nepal) often provoke unintended consequences, including 
exacerbations of local-level inequalities. Projects may unwittingly favor larger or wealthier 
farmers, produce new forms of marginalization and exclusion, or alter customary agricultural 
practices in ways that negatively impact some groups. Examining the results of relevant variables 
employed in Section 7, I can evaluate the impacts of the introduction of vegetable crops on inter-
farm equity in Mid-Western Nepal and answer the question: do high-value vegetables appear to 
be a progressive or regressive instrument for poverty reduction in Nepal? 
 Variables in the dataset that measure or proxy wealth or social status include Farm Size, 
Assets, and Higher Caste. Farmers in Mid-Western Nepal generally have few assets, and the 
majority of their wealth is encapsulated in their landholding. Thus, farmers with larger 
landholdings are presumably wealthier than farmers with smaller holdings. And while assets are 
not a large factor in the region, they do constitute an alternative measure of a farm household’s 
wealth. Finally, all regressions in Section 7 controlled for the dummy variable Higher Caste, 
which measured whether a farmer was Brahmin or Chhetri on the one hand, or from another 
group (often indigenous, such as Tharu) on the other. While ethnicity is a complex and contested 
topic in Nepal, there is a broad consensus in the political economy literature that belonging to 
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one of the “higher caste” groups continues to confer social and economic benefits (Thapa 2007). 
Thus, the Higher Caste dummy measures the effect of these status differentials. 
 If vegetables were a regressive technology, we would expect Farm Size, Assets, and 
Higher Caste to be positively associated with vegetable adoption. In contrast, if vegetables are 
progressive, we would expect these variables to be negatively associated with adoption. 
Regression results indicate that farm size is significantly negatively associated, assets positively 
associated, and Higher Caste negatively associated with vegetable adoption. Explanations for 
Farm Size and Assets’ negative effects have been discussed above. The negative relation 
between Higher Caste status and vegetable adoption is strong and surprising. The Logit model 
suggests that moving from a low to high caste status coincides with a 22% decline in the 
probability of vegetable adoption. There are a number of possible explanations for this 
relationship. Higher caste farmers may be better networked into staple crop production systems, 
thus increasing their returns to scale and profits from these crops relative to lower caste farmers. 
They may control higher quality lands that favor staple crop production (land quality was 
unmeasured in the survey). Finally, they may have resided on their land longer, resulting in less 
of a need to attempt new techniques in order to survive.
9
  
 In sum, the negative relationships between Farm Size and Higher Caste and vegetable 
adoption suggest that vegetables are a progressive technology, while the positive relationship 
between Assets and adoption suggests a regressive relationship. Since much of farmers’ wealth is 
embodied in their land, however, the farm size effect trumps the assets effect, and vegetables 
appear to be a relatively progressive instrument for poverty alleviation in the region, favoring 
indigenous farmers with smaller landholdings over larger and higher caste farmers. 
                                                          
9
 Many indigenous farmers have come upon their landholdings only recently, either due to government reform 
measures or to unrest caused by the recent civil conflict in the region. 
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9. Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
 Stagnation in agricultural productivity in Nepal has resulted in widespread rural poverty 
and malnutrition. Rural areas have seen little improvement in standards of living over the last 
three decades, while conspicuous consumption has become ever more visible in urban areas. 
This growing intra-national inequality recently contributed to a decade-long civil war that ended 
only in 2006. The Mid-Western Development Region, Nepal’s poorest, was the epicenter of this 
civil war and is still struggling to realize meaningful agricultural development.  
 International donor institutions and the Nepali government have sought to introduce high-
value vegetable crops as a means of improving agricultural productivity, increasing incomes 
among smallhold farmers, and diversifying diets. Nonetheless, vegetable adoption in the region 
has been slow at best. 
 Vegetables are more profitable than customary staple crops such as rice and maize. 
Because they require higher labor inputs and more individualized attention, they exhibit constant 
returns to scale, whereas staples exhibit increasing returns to scale. Vegetables exhibit greater 
variance in returns, and are therefore riskier than staple crops as well. Consequently, scale, 
capital, and risk constraints could potentially limit farmers’ ability and willingness to adopt. 
Analyzing a survey conducted by the author of 78 farmers from Nepal’s Mid-Western 
Development region, this study computed Logit, Probit, OLS, and Ordered Probit regression 
models to measure the effects of a range of explanatory variables on farmers’ vegetable adoption 
decisions. Regression results show that Farm Area, Distance to an Agricultural Supplier, Higher 
Caste status, and Food Insecurity are all significantly negatively associated with the probability 
of vegetable adoption, while farmers’ Age, level of Agricultural Training, and number of Assets 
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are significantly positively associated with probability of adoption. These variables have similar 
effects on the scale of vegetable adoption as well. 
The negative relation between Farm Area and probability of vegetable adoption is likely 
a result of the difference in labor-intensity between vegetable and staple crops. Smaller farms 
optimally adopt labor-intensive vegetables to capitalize on their comparative advantage in labor, 
while larger farmers, being relatively labor-poor and land rich, produce land-intensive staple 
crops instead. Large farmers are prevented from adopting larger shares of vegetables by a 
revealed labor shortage in the region. Typical of developing country agrarian economies, it 
appears that labor markets are not properly functioning in Mid-Western Nepal.  
 I further find that risk and uncertainty constitute significant constraints to vegetable 
adoption. Variables such as Distance to Agrovet, Agricultural Training, Age, Assets, and Food 
Insecurity that proxy farmers’ levels of risk or information-poverty are consistently negatively 
associated with probability of vegetable adoption. Annual country-level vegetable prices in 
Nepal are notably more volatile than are prices for staple products, and local-level seasonal 
prices are likely much more volatile still. Coupled with a lack of functioning insurance and credit 
markets, this volatility increases farmers’ risk from vegetable adoption and prevents more 
marginal or risk averse farmers from adopting, potentially locking them into poverty traps.  
  
Policy Recommendations 
 These results suggest a number of potential policy adjustments that could improve Nepali 
farmers’ ability to benefit from high-value vegetables. The challenges faced by large farmers in 
overcoming labor shortages or bottlenecks could be reduced through government or donor-
supported tractor and tiller-sharing collectives. Policy makers could lend support to local 
organizations that collectively purchase labor-saving mechanical inputs such as tractors and then 
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rent or share them amongst farmers. Nevertheless, given that much of the labor required for 
vegetables is individualized and cannot be facilitated by mechanized inputs, this policy measure 
would have only a limited capacity to promote vegetable adoption among large farmers. 
Furthermore, this measure would reduce the currently progressive nature of vegetable crops by 
disproportionately aiding larger farmers. 
 More effective policy measures would reduce the risk farmers assume when adopting 
vegetables. Policymakers could facilitate the organization and implementation of village 
marketing collectives, which allow farmers to partially collectivize risk and improve bargaining 
power vis a vis buyers. This would reduce price volatility at the point of sale and allow farmers 
to more predictably plan investment and production strategies. 
 Furthermore, government agencies should work to roll out effective crop insurance 
programs in the region, and should work to regulate village-level creditors so as to avoid 
predatory lending. Farmers confront considerable risks when choosing to produce cash-crops for 
the market, and while vegetable production may be the most efficient outcome in macro-level 
productivity terms, individual farmers often find it unfeasible without some sort of insurance and 
credit support. Moreover, given the increasing volatility of weather patterns in Nepal as a result 
of global climate change, farmers are in ever greater need of insurance against not only price 
swings, but landslides, floods, and droughts. 
 As demonstrated in the regression analysis, each additional agricultural training that 
farmers attended was associated with a 3.9% increase in the likelihood of vegetable adoption. 
Clearly, training programs should be extended, as well as state-directed agricultural extension 
services and support of Agrovet-level expertise. Agricultural training diffuses information and 
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best practices among farmers and reduces the uncertainty involved in adopting new technologies, 
including high-value vegetables.  
 Finally, given the strong negative impact of Food Insecurity on vegetable adoption, 
measures should be taken to improve food security exogenously to the vegetable-promotion 
process. While vegetable adoption itself is often intended as an instrument to improve food 
security, my detection of potential poverty traps suggests that additional measures must be taken 
to grant farmers a level of food security sufficient to allow them to assume the risks of vegetable 
adoption in the first place. The traditional mechanisms built into the functioning of the Nepal 
Food Corporation should be re-worked to better distribute internal food surpluses to food deficit 
regions on a seasonal basis. 
 Vegetables have the potential to be an effective instrument for progressive poverty 
reduction in Nepal. However, these crops must arrive as part of a broader, networked package of 
extension services, insurance and credit programs, and donor-led or government supports. 
Without these policy interventions, farmers may remain unable to access the potential benefits 
offered by high-value vegetables. 
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Appendix A:    Calculating Farmers’ Costs and Returns to Production 
The field survey (see Survey Appendices) employed to collect the data set described in 
Section 4 decomposes costs of production into labor costs, capital costs, costs of credit, 
opportunity costs of land, and opportunity costs of investment. The survey also collected general 
demographic and geographic information.  The survey measured costs of one crop for one 
growing season.  
 Labor costs include all payments to hired farm laborers, as well as the wage-value of all 
family and unpaid neighbors’ labor that was invested in the production of the surveyed crop 
for that season.  The valuation of unpaid labor is discussed in Part A.1 below. 
 Capital costs include the costs of all capital inputs for the production of one season of the 
surveyed crop.  The process of valuing these inputs is discussed in greater detail in Part A.2. 
 Cost of credit was measured as the cost of interest for the portion of a farmer’s loan going 
towards the surveyed crop. Details are given in Part A.3. 
 Opportunity Costs of Land and Investment are further discussed in Part A.4. 
 
A.1 Pricing Unpaid Farm Labor 
The cost of hired labor is easily calculated.  Total hours of hired labor are multiplied by 
the local market wage to find total cost of hired labor.  Farmers in Mid-Western Nepal, however, 
rarely hire labor.  Most rely on unpaid labor from themselves, their own families, or unpaid 
neighbors.  Communities often pool labor during periods of planting and harvest.  
A sizeable body of literature exists on the pricing of unpaid farm labor. Many studies 
suggest that assigning a market wage to this labor will overstimate the value of unpaid farm labor, 
because farmers tend to “self-exploit” and work beyond the point at which the marginal returns 
of their labor equal the marginal costs (Huffman 1996).  Because many farmers have very little 
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opportunity cost to their time, they work for long hours on their farms, even though the value 
they are creating in these hours may be very low.  Thus, assigning a market wage to these hours 
would drastically overestimate the value added to production.   
Furthermore, the labor investment in a family farm’s crop production may involve 
diverse labor inputs: men, women, and childrens’ labor, as well as highly trained and untrained 
labor.  Again, assigning a single wage to labor irrespective of gender, age, and training, ignores 
the complexity of agricultural practice.   
The real cost of a farmer’s unpaid farm labor is the opportunity cost of her off-farm 
employment, that is, what she could earn if she reallocated her farm-labor time to outside 
employment.  Or, perhaps more accurately in small village settings (such as that of the Mid-
Western Development Region) where off-farm employment opportunities are scarce, the real 
cost of the farmer’s labor is the opportunity cost of her leisure (Huffman 1996). Putting a 
numerical value on how much each farmer values his or her leisure time is, of course, unfeasible.   
However, a measure of off-farm opportunity cost can be constructed.  As suggested in El-Osta 
and Ahearn (1996), the opportunity cost of off-farm employment can be estimated as a factor of 
human capital variables. Age, gender, level of education, and level of agricultural training all 
determine the wage that could be received off-farm.    
Drawing upon the results of El-Osta and Ahearn (1996), we constructed a weighted wage 
that adjusts the local market wage according to the individual farmer’s level of human capital.  
The human capital variables considered were Age, Education, Number of Agricultural Trainings 
attended, and Gender.  Education was considered the most influential variable. Many farmers in 
the survey area are illiterate, while others possess higher education beyond secondary school. 
Those with more education clearly have wider off-farm employment opportunities.  The next 
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most important variable was considered to be Number of Agricultural Trainings.  Farmers with 
knowledge of high-value vegetable cultivation, mechanized inputs, chemical fertilizer and 
pesticide, and nursery or seed techniques have valuable skill sets that could confer upon them 
higher earning potential.  Thirdly, Age is considered a decisive variable because agricultural 
labor in the region is physically demanding.  Bending over, repetitive motions, heavy lifting, and 
high temperatures all mean that older laborers would be less productive than younger ones, and 
could thus command a lower off-farm labor wage.  Furthermore, very young laborers 
(considered here as those under 20 years old) are less experienced, and may thus require more 
supervision. Finally, gender is determinative in off-farm earning capacity because the regional 
average market wage for men is around 300 NRs per day, while for women it is around 200-250 
NRs per day. The relative importance of these four variables is encapsulated in Equation 1: 
Equation 1. Adjusted Wage = Local Market Wage *((0.2*Age)+ 
(0.4*Education)+(0.25*Agro. Trainings)+(0.15*Gender)) 
 
Equation 1 adjusts the local market wage with weighted Age, Education, Agro. Trainings, and 
Gender components.  If values of 1 were input for Age, Education, Agro. Trainings, and Gender, 
the equation would simply return the local market wage.  If, instead of 1, the weighted values 
given in Table 18 are insterted, the local market wage will be depressed to a new, adjusted wage 
that accounts for the farmer’s level of human capital. 
Table 18. 
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These values are arrived at arbitrarily, but can be calibrated using an alternative method 
of calculating the value of unpaid labor.  This is the “consumption method.” In subsistence 
agricultural practices, many laborers may not receive a wage, but are instead paid “in kind.” 
They receive the value of their labor as a portion of the final harvest into which their labor was 
invested.   Even farmers’ children in a sense receive a payment in kind for their labor on the farm, 
in the form of their food allotment. Thus, measuring the value of the crop production consumed 
by the laborer gives the value of that worker’s labor.  The problem with this approach is that 
calculating the value of consumption is possible only when data exists for all the crops grown on 
the farm.  The current study focuses on just one crop per farmer.  Thus, calculating the value of 
tomatos consumed by the farmer would be relatively simple: 
Equation 2. 
(Total Tomato Yield – Volume of Tomatoes Sold) = Total Volume Tomatoes Consumed 
 
(Total Volume Tomatoes Consumed) / (Number of Family Members) = Tomato 
Consumption per Family Member 
 
(Tomato Consumption per Family Member)*Market Tomato Price = Value of Tomato 
Consumption 
 
This seasonal value could be further decomposed into a daily wage. 
Nevertheless, this method cannot capture the value of consumption of other crops, and is 
therefore not a valid estimation of total consumption.  There are, however, situations in which 
the survey was able to measure the crop production for an entire farm.  These are the cases in 
which the farmer was growing a single crop (usually rice) on all of her land.  In these cases, the 
average consumption (when converted to daily wage) amounts to around 241 NRs per day.  
Using this approximate benchmark value, the weightings in Table 18 can be calibrated to 
approximate 241 NRs.  With the given weightings, the average adjusted wage for all survey data 
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is 250.2 NRs per day.  It is to be expected that the adjusted wage be slightly higher than the 
consumption value for the rice growers, since these 100% rice cultivation farms often represent 
the lowest value farms in their communities.    
 
A.2 Depreciating Capital Costs 
Capital inputs measured in the study include: 
Tractor  Hoses 
Motor Tiller Pesticide 
Thresher Jhol Mol 
Plow Animal Manure 
Motor Pump Chemical Fertilizers 
Water Tanks Seeds 
Irrigation Canals Motor Transport 
Sprinklers Plastic Houses 
 
Major capital inputs such as tractors, tillers, and pumps often last for more than one 
season.  Since the study seeks to measure costs of production for 
a single crop for a single season, these long term capital inputs must be depreciated. Long-term 
capital inputs were considered to be: Tractors, Motor Tillers, Threshers, Motor Pumps, Hoses, 
and Plastic Houses. The single season, single crop value is calculated as: 
 
Equation 3. 
Single Season/Single crop value of long-term capital input =  
(Initial Cost of Input)/(Estimated life-span of input)/(Proportion of total landholding dedicated to 
target crop)/(# of seasons that field can be planted) 
 
Further accounting must be made for byproduct incomes.  Many farmers use significant 
amounts of manure and jhol mol (a formulation of livestock urine used as fertilzer and 
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biopesticide) on their fields, which we assess at a cost of between 35 and 50 NRs per doka (a unit 
of measurement referring to a traditional basket, typically holding about 10 kilograms of manure).  
Nevertheless, the farmers feed these livestock on byproducts from their crop production.  Thus, 
crop byproduct value cancels out the cost of jhol mol and manure.  The study accounts for this 
by reducing jhol mol and manure costs for those farmers growing crops with useable byproduct  
 
A.3 Costs of Credit 
Many farmers in the region have taken out loans to cover costs of crop production.  
Interest rates average 13%, and costs of credit can be significant for some farmers.  Costs of 
credit are assessed according to the following formula: 
 
Equation 4. 
Cost of Credit = (Amount of Loan*Duration of Loan*Interest Rate) / (Number of Seasons Crop 
is Planted per year) 
Note: Amount of Loan is itself adjusted.  Farmers report total loan amount, and detail for which 
crops the loan is used.  Surveyers calculated the proportion of the total loan value that went 
toward the specific focus crop of the survey.  This reduced value is the value entered as “Amount 
of Loan” in the above equation. 
A.4 Opportunity Costs of Land and Investment 
In some communities in the MWDR most farmers own their own land and there is a very 
limited or non-existent rental market for land.  In these communities, the opportunity cost of land 
leasing may be very low, or even zero. However, in communities in which at least one farmer 
reported leasing land, this study assessed opportunity costs of land as the per ropani lease price 
of land multiplied by the number of ropanis of the focus crop under cultivation.  
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While opportunities for non-farm investment are often low in the MWDR, farmers do 
have the ability to reallocate farm investment into non-farm enterprises or migration. This study 
assess the opportunity cost of investment as 5% of all labor and capital expenditures. 
 
Further key results were calculated using the formulas below:
10
 
Equation 5.  
Labor Cost Per Ropani = Total cost of paid and unpaid labor (at adjusted unpaid labor wage) / 
ropani under cultivation 
Equation 6.  
Capital Cost per Ropani = Total cost of all capital inputs (with long-term inputs depreciated) / 
ropani under cultivation 
Equation 7.  
Total Cost per Ropani = Total labor and capital costs / ropani under cultivation 
Equation 8. 
Total Cost per kg. = Total labor and capital costs / number of kilograms produced  
Equation 9. 
Revenue per Ropani = (Total kilograms produced)*(Retail price per kilogram) / ropani under 
cultivation 
Equation 10.  
Net Profit per Ropani = (Total Revenue per ropani – Total Cost per ropani) / ropani under 
cultivation 
Equation 11. 
Cost of Land Preparation = ((Hours of paid and unpaid labor invested in the stage of Land 
Preparation)*(Adjusted wage)) + Tractor Cost + Motor Tiller Cost + Plough Animal Cost + 
Plastic Houses Cost 
 
                                                          
10
 Note: The ropani is one of the traditional land units of Nepal.  One ropani is equal to approximately 0.051 hectares.  
Ropani are used throughout this report because they are the unit of reference in Nepali agriculture, and because they 
provide smaller values than per hectare terms.  Given the small size of Nepali farmers, the ropani simply makes 
more sense. 
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Equation 12. 
Cost of Planting = ((Hours of paid and unpaid labor invested in the stage of Planting)*(Adjusted 
wage)) + Seed Cost 
Equation 13. 
Cost of Land Maintenance = ((Hours of paid and unpaid labor invested in the stage of Land 
Maintenance)*(Adjusted wage)) + Pesticide Cost + Jhol Mol/Manure Cost + Chemical Fertilizer 
Cost + Hoses Cost + Sprinklers Cost + Water Tanks Cost 
Equation 14. 
Cost of Harvest = ((Hours of paid and unpaid labor invested in the stage of Harvest)*(Adjusted 
wage)) + Thresher Cost 
Equation 15. 
Cost of Post-Harvest = ((Hours of paid and unpaid labor invested in the stage of Post-
Harvest)*(Adjusted wage)) + Transportation Cost 
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Appendix B: Evaluating the Inverse Farm Size–Productivity Relationship 
 The relative productivity of large versus small farms is one of the oldest and most 
thoroughly debated topics in agricultural economics. Based upon the foundational works of 
Chayanov (1925) and Sen (1962), economists in the 1960s began advancing the argument that 
small farms could in fact be more productive than large farms due to higher per unit labor and 
capital inputs (the so-called Inverse Relationship (IR) between farm size and productivity) 
(Barrett, Carter, and Timmer 2010).  
 The IR debate acquired heated practical significance as land reform movements swept 
Asia and Africa in the post-war period, with advocates of land redistribution citing Sen’s 
findings as evidence that smaller plots would be more, rather than less, efficient than larger 
farms (Thapa 2007). Critics of the IR hypothesis argue that the inverse relationship disappears 
with sufficiently high levels of capital inputs, and is thus relevant only in traditional agricultural 
sectors (Fan and Chan-Kang 2005). Others point out that much of the observed IR may actually 
be explained by commonly unobserved farm-level characteristics such as land quality (Bhalla 
and Roy 1988).  
 The results of studies of the IR in Nepal have yielded mixed results. Bhandari (2006) 
used district-level data to conclude that a positive relationship exists between scale of 
landholdings and per-hectare productivity, contradicting the IR hypothesis. But using farm-level 
data from the Western hills, Thapa (2007) measured a negative relationship between farm size 
and per hectare, per labor hour, and per expenditure productivity, confirming the IR hypothesis.  
 In the case of those farmers from the Mid-Western Development Region included in my 
field survey, a measured inverse relationship could indicate the failure of labor and capital 
markets to properly proportion and allocate resources amongst farmers. 
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 The standard OLS model used to measure the relation between farm size and productivity 
is given by: 
Equation 1:            ln(𝑌𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝐿𝑖) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖11 
Where Yi is total yield per hectare, Li measures the total area of crop land, Xi is a vector of 
socioeconomic variables that could affect productivity, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. Some critics of 
the IR have argued that while productivity may be higher on small farms in per hectare terms, it 
is not higher in per labor hour and per expenditure terms. To measure the effect of crop area on 
these alternative measures of productivity, we can also estimate: 
Equation 2:           ln(𝐻𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝐿𝑖) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Equation3:           ln(𝐶𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝐿𝑖) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where Hi measures yield per labor hour invested, and Ci measures yield per hundred NR invested. 
 The farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics that may influence productivity are identified 
as Age, Education, Assets, and Vegetable Adoption. Dummies measuring higher caste status and 
district were rejected since they were insignificant in all regressions. Age should have an 
ambiguous relation with productivity, since older farmers are more experienced (which suggests 
a positive relationship), but younger farmers may be more innovative and open to new 
techniques and resources (also suggesting a positive effect). Education should be positively 
associated with productivity, as should be assets and vegetable adoption (see Section 5, Fact 3).  
 If an inverse relationship exists between farm size and productivity, coefficient 𝛽 should 
be significantly negative. Since Mid-Western Nepal is characterized by traditional agricultural 
practice, I hypothesize that the IR will hold for per hectare productivity. The existence of an IR 
between farm size and per labor input and per capital input productivity is an empirical question. 
                                                          
11
 From Thapa (2007) 
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Table 19 below presents OLS regression results on the relationship between farm size and 
productivity for the three models identified in Equations 1, 2, and 3 above.  
 
Table 19. OLS Regression Results: Effect of Crop Area on Returns per Hectare 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
*=significant at 10% level 
 
 The regression results presented in Table 19 indicate that a statistically significant and 
negative relationship exists between crop area and yield, labor hours, and capital input per 
hectare, when controlling for relevant farmer characteristics. Thus, the existence of an inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity is confirmed for my dataset.  
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables 
 
Log of Yield per Ha. Log of Labor Hrs. per Ha. Log of Capital Input per Ha. 
Log of Crop Area -0.1209* -0.3454*** -0.2774*** 
 
(0.0698) (0.1107) (0.0607) 
Age 0.0262 -0.5815** -0.1798 
 
(0.1885) (0.2783) (0.1725) 
Education 0.1730* -0.0893 0.0820 
 
(0.1244) (0.1377) (0.0893) 
Assets 0.1821** -0.0929 0.1176 
 
(0.0817) (0.1256) (0.0954) 
Vegetable Adoption 1.1096*** 0.8403** 0.6702*** 
 
(0.1971) (0.3201) (0.1593) 
Constant 8.9769*** 10.1915*** 12.5937*** 
 
(0.7201) (1.0717) (0.6397) 
Goodness of Fit: 
   
R-Squared 0.6439 0.6769 0.7413 
    
Root MSE 0.5751 0.6207 0.4328 
F(5,72) 25.99 36.53 39.30 
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 Table 19 shows that age, education, assets all appear as significant explanators of 
productivity as well. But even when comparing for these socioeconomic variables, the strongest 
effects on productivity appear to be crop area and vegetable adoption. Vegetable adoption has a 
consistently positive effect on productivity, while crop area has a consistently negative effect. 
The negative effect of crop area on productivity holds not only for productivity in per hectare 
terms, but for per labor hour and per capital input terms as well.  
 These findings confirm the results presented in Thapa (2007), which measured an IR 
between farm size and productivity in Western Nepal. The analysis presented here, however, 
could be vulnerable to criticisms presented by Bhalla and Roy (1988), since I did not control for 
land and soil quality variables. Nevertheless, the strong results in Table 13 suggest that indeed 
smaller farms in Mid-Western Nepal are more productive than larger farmers. This is likely a 
demonstration of the continuing prevalence of traditional, low-capital intensity farming practices 
in the region.  
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Appendix C.                   Field Surveys 
 
Questionnaire to Estimate Costs of Production (English) 
 
0. General Information 
 
0.1 Date:_____________________________________ 
0.2 Form #:___________________________________ 
0.3 District:___________________________________ 
0.4 VDC:_____________________________________ 
0.5 Ward:_____________________________________ 
0.6 Village:____________________________________ 
0.7 Group Name/#:______________________________ 
 
1. Personal Information 
 
1.1 Name of Respondent:____________________________________ 
1.2 Age:________________________ 
1.3 Gender:  
 Male 
 Female 
1.4. Number of Family Members:____________________________ 
1.5 Respondent’s Position in Group: (Check One) 
 Chairperson    
 Secretary 
 Member 
 Other:_______________ 
1.5 Education: 
 Illiterate 
 Informal (Adult Literacy) 
 Primary (1-5) 
 Secondary (6-10) 
 SLC 
 Higher  
1.6 Ethnicity:  
 Brahmin 
 Chhetri 
 Janajati 
 Dalit 
 Other:________
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1.7 Which KISAN trainings or demonstrations have you attended? 
 Plastic Houses/Drip Irrigation 
 Planting Techniques 
 Storage Technologies 
 Seed Varieties 
 Chemical Fertilizer 
 Livestock 
 Jhol-Mol 
 Pest Management (IPM) 
 Rhizobium Culture 
 
2.  Socioeconomic  Status 
 
2.1 Primary Source of Income: 
 Grain Crops 
 High Value Vegetables 
 Livestock 
 Tourism/Business 
 Business 
 Government service 
 Non-Timber Forest Products 
 Other: _________________ 
 
2.2 Assets (Check all that apply): 
 Cellphone 
 Radio 
 TV  
 Electricity  
 Motorcycle  
 Bicycle  
 Bullock Cart  
 Truck/Tractor  
 Livestock 
 Poultry 
 Agro. Machinery 
o Pump 
o Tiller 
o Thresher 
o _________________ 
 Gas Stove 
 Multiple Water Use System (MUS) 
 Solar Home System (SHS) 
 Biogas 
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2.3 Distance to nearest road:_________________________________ 
 
2.4 Distance to nearest Market:________________________________ 
 
2.5 What is the source of wateryou’re your farm:_______________________________ 
 
2.6 Services Accessible: 
 
2.6.1 Is there an Agrovet supplier near your farm?  
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, 
2.6.2 How long does it take to get to Agrovet supplier:  
 Walking _______________ 
 Bus/vehicle __________ 
 
2.6.3 What services are available there? 
o Pump 
o Drip Hoses(pipe) 
o Sprayers 
o Seed 
o Fertilizer 
o Pesticide 
o Water Storage Tanks 
 
2.6.4 Are any other services available near your farm? 
 Agricultural Extension Services 
o Government Services 
o Non-Government Services 
 Agro. Machinery 
o Tractor 
o Tiller 
o Thresher 
 
3. Land 
3.1 Land Ownership Status:  
 Farming on their own land 
 Leasing land 
o If leasing: Cost of lease:________________ 
o Lease Period:_________________________ 
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3.2 What is the area of the farm? (Specify 
Kattha/Ropani):__________________________________ 
 
3.3 What type of farming is practiced? 
 Subsistence 
 Commercial 
 
3.4 Is your annual farm income and your food production enough to last your family: 
 For 3 – 6 months 
 For 6 - 9 months 
 For 9 – 12 months 
 More than 1 year 
 
3.5 Crops in Production: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crops in 
Production:
Area of production 
(specify units)
Yield (kg.)
Yield in 
Previous 
Season (kg.)
Volume sold 
(kg.)
Sale price (per 
kg.)
# of Plantings per 
Year
Tomatoes
Cauliflower
Cucumber
Bitter Gourd
Cabbage
Onion 
Chili
Maize 
Lentils
Rice
Other:__________
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4. Investment/Expenditure 
 
4.1 Labor Investment/Expenditure 
 
# of Workers
# of Days 
Worked
Hours Worked 
per day
# of Workers
# of Days 
Worked
Wage 
(+lunch)
# of 
Workers
# of Days 
Worked
Wage 
(+lunch)
Land 
Preparation: 
(getting materials/ 
seeds, ploughing, 
fertilizer, pipes, 
building, etc.)
Planting
Maintenance 
(weeding, 
watering, upkeep, 
fertilizing, pest 
mgmt.)
Harvest
Storage
Transportation
Family and Unpaid Neighbor's Labor Male Workers Female Workers
Hired Labor
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4.2 Capital Investment/Expenditure   
1
st
 Crop: 
 
 
Tomatoes Lentils
Cauliflower Rice
Bitter Gourd Onion 
Cucumber Chili
Cabbage
Maize 
Capital Good:
Owned 
(✓ )
Rented 
(✓ )
Service provider
Service 
Provider's 
Dist. From 
Farm (km.)
Duration 
of Use
Tools/Machinery:
Tractor
Tiller 
Thresher
Plough Animal
Irrigation:
Pumps
Tanks
Drip Hoses
Sprinklers
Pesticide:
Fertilizer:
Jhol Mol/Manure
Chemical
Seed
Technical Assistance
Transportation
Other Inputs:
Fence
String
Plastic Houses
Planting Trays
Coconut Peat
Buildings
Other:
Type of crop 
(circle one):
Other:________________________
Unit
Cost      
(per unit)
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2
nd
 Crop: 
 
 
Tomatoes Lentils
Cauliflower Rice
Bitter Gourd Onion 
Cucumber Chili
Cabbage
Maize 
Capital Good:
Owned 
(✓ )
Rented 
(✓ )
Service provider
Service 
Provider's 
Dist. From 
Farm (km.)
Duration 
of Use
Tools/Machinery:
Tractor
Tiller 
Thresher
Plough Animal
Irrigation:
Pumps
Tanks
Drip Hoses
Sprinklers
Pesticide:
Fertilizer:
Jhol Mol/Manure
Chemical
Seed
Technical Assistance
Transportation
Other Inputs:
Fence
String
Plastic Houses
Planting Trays
Coconut Peat
Buildings
Other:
Type of crop 
(circle one):
Other:________________________
Unit
Cost      
(per unit)
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5 Challenges to Accessing Inputs: 
 
5.2 From the following list, identify which are the most important to the farmer (check up to 
three) and comment on what the challenges are for those inputs: 
 
Irrigation:________________________________________________________ 
Pesticide:________________________________________________________ 
Fertilizer:_________________________________________________________ 
Seed:____________________________________________________________ 
Equipment:________________________________________________________ 
Technical Assistance:________________________________________________ 
Transportation:_____________________________________________________ 
Structures:_________________________________________________________ 
Other:____________________________________________________________ 
 
6 Estimating Total Investment and Revenue: 
 
6.1 (Identify Units) 
 
 
Estimated total 
investment per crop:
Estimated Total 
Invesment
Estimated Total 
Income
Tomatoes
Cauliflower
Cucumber
Bitter Gourd
Cabbage
Maize 
Lentils
Rice
Onion 
Chili
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7 Credit: 
7.2 Are you a member of any formal or informal groups? 
 Yes 
 No 
7.1.1 If yes, which groups? 
 Forest Users’ Group 
 Water Users’ Group 
 Savings & Loan Group 
 Other (NGO) 
7.1.2 What services do you get from this group? 
_____________________________________________________________________
____ 
 7.2 Do you currently have a loan? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes:   
 7.2.1 What type of loan is 
it?___________________________________________ 
 7.2.2 What is the amount of the 
loan?____________________________________ 
 7.2.3 What is the interest rate of the 
loan?_________________________________ 
 7.2.4 What is the status of the 
loan?______________________________________ 
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Questionnaire to Estimate Costs of Production (Nepali) 
;fgf ls;fg v]tL pTkfb nfut cWoog k|ZgfjnL  
dWo -klZrdf~rn lasf; If]q  
).;fdfGo hfgsf/L  
!. ldlt:_________________________________ 
@. kmfd{ g+ :______________________________ 
#. lhNnf :_______________________________ 
$. uf.lj.; : _____________________________ 
%. j8f g+:________________________________ 
   ^. ufFp:__________________________________ 
   &. ;d'xsf] gfd :____________________________ 
 
!. AolQmut hfgsf/L 
       !.! pQ/ stf{sf] gfd:____________________ 
       !.@ pd]/:______________________ 
       !.# ln+u  
 k'?if   dlxnf
!.$ s'n kl/jf/ :+fVof :____________________________ 
! .% pQ/ stf{sf] ;d'xdf kb: 
 cWoIf     
 ;lrj   
 ;b:o   
 cGo _________________ 
 
!.%: lzIff   
 lg/If/  
 cgf}krfl/s (k|}f9 
lzIff )  
 k|fylds (!-% )  
 dfWolds (^-!)) 
 P;.Pn.;L 
 pRr lzIff   
!.^: hft:    
 a|fxd0f   
 If]qL    
 hghftL  
 
 blnt  
 cGo  ___________________
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!=&M s] tkfO{n] s'g} KISAN tflnd jf k|bz]gdf efu lng'ePsf] 5< 
 Knfl:6s 3/ / yf]kf l;+rfO{ 
 /f]kfO प्रविधी 
 Ef08f/ / yGSofpg] प्रविधी 
 aLpsf प्रकार 
 /f;fogLs Dfn 
 kz' kfng   
 emf]n df]n 
 एकीकृत शत्रजुीि व्यिस्थापन (IPM) 
 राइजोबियम पद्धती
 
@ .;fdflhs cfly{s ljj/0f   
@.! k|fylds cfDbfgLsf] ;|f]t : 
 cGg jfnL   
 pRr d'No t/sf/L v]tL   
 kz' kfng   
 ko{6g  
 ;/sf/L hflu/   
 Aofkf/   
 u}/ sfi7 pTkfbg  
 cGo:  ____________________ 
 
@.@:;DklQ:   
 df]jfO{n 
 ;fO{sn   
 /]l8of]    
 l6.eL  
 ljh'nL aQL 
 df]6/ ;fOsn  
 uf9f    
 6 «s / 6]S6/    
 Kfz'kfng   
 s'v'/f kfng   
  s[ifL cf}hf/ / d]zLg   
o kDk   
o 6Ln/   
o Yf|];/   
o _________________ 
 UofF; r'nf]  
 िहु उद्देश्यLo l;+rfO k|0fnL (MUS) 
 ;f]nf/ 3/]n' k|0fnL (SHS)   
 Affof] UofF;  
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@.# glhssf] af6f]sf] b'/L: ____________ 
      @.$ glhsf] xf6ahf//ahf/sf] b'/L: ____________ 
      @.% v]tLsf] nfuL kflgsf] ;|f]t :____________ 
        @.^ pknAw ;]jfx? : 
@.^.! s] tkfO{sf] ghLs} s[ifL ;fdfu|L ljqm]tf (Pu|f]e]6) 5? 
 5   
 5}g   
Plb 5 eg], 
@.^.@ ToxfF k'Ug nfUg] ;do :  
 Kf}bn _______________ 
 Af; / uf8L   __________ 
@.^.# s'g s[ifL ;fdfu|L kfOG5 ?  
o kDk   
o  l8 «k (kfOd) 
o  :k]|o/ 
o  aLp  
o  Dfn  
o  laifflb   
o  kfgL 6\ofÍ 
@.^.$: c? s'g} ;]jf kfO{G5 ? 
 s[ifL k|;f/ ;]jf  
o ;/sf/L ;]jf   
o  u}/ ;/sf/L ;]jf  
 s[ifL cf}hf/ / d]zLg   
o 6] «S6/   
o 6Ln/   
o y|];/ 
o _____________________  
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#. Hldg   
#.!Hfldgsf] clwk|x0f l:ylt : 
 lglh  
 7]sfaGws / ef8f  
o  Ef8fsf] nfut :_______ 
o  7]sfsf] cjlw :_______ 
#.@ hldgsf] If]qkmn (/f]kgL/s¶f :_______________________________ 
#.# v]tL s'g lsl;dsf] xf] ? 
 lgjf{xd'vL  
 Aoj;flos   
#.$ v]tLsf] pTkfbg ,vkt / lalqmn] tkfFOsf] kl/j/nfO{ slt dlxgf k'U5 ? 
 # -^ dlxgf  
 ^-( dlxgf 
 (-!@ dlxgf  
 ! jif{ eGbf a9L 
 
afnLsf] gfd  If]qkmn 
( /f]kgL /s¶f) 
pTkfbg 
( s].hL) 
ut aflnsf] 
pTkfbg 
(s] .hL) 
lalqm dfqf 
(s].hL) 
lalqmb/ k|lt 
(s].hL) 
Afif{df slt k6s 
afnL nufpg' 
x'G5 ? 
Uff]ne]8f       
sfpnL       
sfFqmf]       
s/]nf       
AfGbf       
Kofh       
v';f{gL       
Dfs}       
bfn/bnxg       
Wfg       
cGo        
#.% ptkfbg x'g] aflnx? 
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$. nfut 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
;FVof 
Hfg >dsf] 
lbg 
k|lt lbg ug]{ 
sfd 
(306fdf) ;FVof
Hfg >dsf] 
lbg
Hofnf+ 
(vfhf vr{) ;FVof
Hfg >dsf] 
lbg
Hofnf+ (vfhf 
vr{)
hdLgsf] tof/L(;fdfg /aLp 
cf];fg]{, hf]Tg], ;Dofpg], dn 
xfNg] cflb)
/f]kfFO{ -5g]{, /f]Kg]  l;+rfO{ )
x]/rfx ug]{(emf/ pv]Ng], 
kflg xfNg],/]vb]v ug]{,dn / 
ljifflbsf] k|of]u cflb )
afnL sf6\g]
Ef08f//yGSofpg] 
9'jfgL
kl/jf/ / l5d]sL hgz;lQm ef8f  / ls/fof hgzlQm   
k'?if dlxnf
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$.@: kF'hLut nut  
klxnf] afnL 
 
Uff]ne]8f sfpnL sfFqmf] s/]nf AfGbf Kofh v';f{gL
Dfs} bfn/bnxg Wfg
cGo
lglh ef8fdf
;]jfk|wfg 
ug]{ AolQm / 
:fF:yf 
;]jf k|wfg 
ug]{sf] b'/L 
(ls.dL.)
kl/df0f 
nfut 
k|lt 
k|of]u u/]sf] 
cjlw 
cf}Hff/ ,d]lzg
6] «S6/
6Ln/
y|];/ 
hf]Tg] a:t'efp
l;FrfO{
kDk 
6\ofÍs 
l8«k, kfO{k  
स्पस्प्रिंकलर
lj;flb    
dn
emf]n df]n 
÷uf]j/    
/f;fogLs  
aLp
k|flalws ;xof]u
9'jfgL
cGo nfut  
af/   
tf/ /8f]/L    
Knfl:6s 3/ 
a]gf{ ;fg]{ ef8f 
Gfl/jn kL6
ejg
cGo   
afnLsf] gfd (Ps lrGx 
nufpg')
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bf];|f] afnL 
 
Uff]ne]8f sfpnL sfFqmf] s/]nf AfGbf Kofh v';f{gL
Dfs} bfn/bnxg Wfg
cGo
lglh ef8fdf
;]jfk|wfg 
ug]{ AolQm / 
:fF:yf 
;]jf k|wfg 
ug]{sf] b'/L 
(ls.dL.)
kl/df0f 
nfut 
k|lt 
k|of]u u/]sf] 
cjlw 
cf}Hff/ ,d]lzg
6] «S6/
6Ln/
y|];/ 
hf]Tg] a:t'efp
l;FrfO{
kDk 
6\ofÍs 
l8«k, kfO{k  
स्पस्प्रिंकलर
lj;flb    
dn
emf]n df]n 
÷uf]j/    
/f;fogLs  
aLp
k|flalws ;xof]u
9'jfgL
cGo nfut  
af/   
tf/ /8f]/L    
Knfl:6s 3/ 
a]gf{ ;fg]{ ef8f 
Gfl/jn kL6
ejg
cGo   
afnLsf] gfd (Ps lrGx 
nufpg')
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%.s[ifL nfut k|fKt ug{  nfUg] r'gf}tLx?: 
 
%.! ;'lraf6 d'Vo s[ifL nfutx?df l6K0fL lbg'xf];\ : 
 
;rfFO{:_____________________________________________ 
laifflb:_____________________________________________ 
dn :______________________________________________ 
aLp:_______________________________________________ 
pks/0f:____________________________________________ 
k|flalws ;xof]u :_______________________________________ 
9'jfgL /oftfoft  :______________________________________ 
Eff}lts ;+/rgf :________________________________________ 
cGo :______________________________________________ 
 
^. cg'dflgt s'n nufgL / cfDbfgL :  
 
AfnLsf] gfd cg'dflgt s'n nufgL cg'dflgt s'n cfDbfgL 
Uff]ne]8f   
sfpnL   
sfFqmf]   
s/]nf   
AfGbf   
Kofh   
v';f{gL   
Dfs}   
bfn/bnxg   
Wfg   
cGo    
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&. shf{ 
&.!. s] tkfO{ s'g} cf}krf/Ls jf cgf}krf/Ls ;d'xdf ;+nUg x'g' x'G5 ? 
 5 
 5}g 
olb 5 eg], 
&.!.! s'g ;d'x? 
 Jfg pkef]Qmf ;d'x   
 Kfflg pkef]Qm ;d'x   
 Afrt tyf ;d'x   
 cGo (u}/ ;/sf/L ;+:yf) 
&.!.@ tkfO{n] s] s:tf] ;]jf / cg'bfg  k|fKt ug'{ x'G5 ? 
____________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
 &.@ s] tkfFO{n] xfn s'g} C0f lng'ePsf] 5 ? 
 5   
 5}g   
Olb 5 eg] :   
&.@.! s'g k|sf/sf] C0f xf] ? ___________________________ 
 &.@.@ C0fsf] /sd slt 5 ?___________________________ 
 &.@.# C0fsf] Aofhb/ slt 5 ?_________________________ 
 &.@.$ C0fsf]  cjZyf(slt lt/]sf] / ltg{ afFsL) s:tf] 5 ? 
________________________________________    
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